Only nine months from now, President Donald Trump will play host to a major summit meeting of the world’s leading industrial countries at his own Trump National Doral Miami resort. The United States has not hosted this gathering of the so-called Group of 20 (G20) nations[1] since 2008, at the height of the global financial crisis, and it will give Trump a major opportunity to rally the world behind his policies.
So what could possibly go wrong?
Plenty. Given Trump’s disdain of G20 practices and themes, it’s reasonable to ask whether assembled leaders—including 19 countries, the European Union, and the African Union—will project a semblance of unity or devolve into acrimony only a month after the US congressional elections. Trump has a long list of grievances against groupings like the G20. The main ones include:
- He banned US participation at the 2025 Johannesburg summit owing to South Africa’s “Solidarity, Equality, Sustainability” theme. Like the three previous summits hosted by Indonesia, India, and Brazil, South Africa sought to promote the goals of the Global South—an agenda much too woke for Trump.
- He has already disinvited South African president Cyril Ramaphosa from the 2026 Miami summit, foreclosing the G20 “troika” process by which the past, present, and future leaders provide continuity for successive summits.
- He has rejected climate change, multilateral trade, international tax cooperation, anti-corruption measures, and gender and women’s rights as G20 summit objectives. These have been central themes in successive G20 meetings, as documented in the G20@20 Review.
Meanwhile, Trump has created his own group, the Board of Peace, which erodes the prominence of the G20 by enlisting Argentina, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey as members.
Apart from Trump’s own G20 peeves, world events are not auspicious. Russian aggression in Ukraine seems set to continue through 2026, while the US-Israel war against Iran could still be smoldering. At the same time, local wars are a seemingly enduring feature of life in Africa and parts of Asia. These are not subjects that G20 leaders normally debate, but life-and-death events in the real world are hard to ignore.
External groups that have contributed to G20 dialogue in the past may receive less notice in 2026. Most prominent are the B20, business firms that remain somewhat engaged with the G20, and the T20, representing think tanks but sidelined in 2026.
Tension between attendees might provide drama in 2026. Sparks could fly if Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelensky meets Russian president Vladimir Putin, or if Japanese prime minister Sanae Takaichi confronts Chinese president Xi Jinping.
The Johannesburg 2025 summit suffered not only a total US absence but also the absence of heads of state from China, Russia, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, Mexico, Argentina, and Nigeria (the most populous country in Africa and an invited guest). Nevertheless, those in attendance agreed on a Leaders' Declaration containing 122 paragraphs of recommendations and aspirations covering a wide range of issues including natural disasters, debt relief, energy access, critical minerals, inclusive growth, artificial intelligence, and more.
To carry out the declaration, South Africa established three task forces, each assigned multiple subjects: inclusive economic growth, industrialization, employment, and reduced inequality; food security; and artificial intelligence, data governance, and innovation for sustainable development. Concrete policies remain to emerge from the task forces.
Meanwhile, Brazil, South Africa, and Spain jointly supported an International Panel on Inequality, modelled on the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, but this trendy suggestion was not embraced by other leaders.
In sharp contrast with sprawling Johannesburg aspirations, in December 2025 the US State Department announced a short agenda for the Miami summit:
Under President Trump’s leadership, we will return the G20 to focusing on its core mission of driving economic growth and prosperity to produce results.
As we usher in these much-needed reforms, we will prioritize three core themes: unleashing economic prosperity by limiting regulatory burdens, unlocking affordable and secure energy supply chains, and pioneering new technologies and innovations.
These are worthy topics, but they do not embrace the aspirations of the Global South nor the concerns of advanced countries over climate change and multilateral trade rules. Underscoring the dawn of a new day, the US G20 website declares “The Best is Yet to Come” alongside a photo of Trump.
Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent has scheduled four meetings of the 2026 in-person G20 Finance Track for finance ministers and central bankers to advance pro-growth economic policies:
…through modernizing financial regulation; strengthening our understanding of excessive global imbalances; enhancing debt transparency and facilitating debt restructuring processes; endorsing a vibrant digital assets ecosystem; improving cross-border payments and addressing payments fraud and scams; and promoting financial literacy.
Will Trump propose a Leaders' Declaration that focuses solely on regulatory burdens, energy supply, new technologies, and the financial issues outlined by Bessent?
If he does, will leaders of the Global South circulate an alternative declaration advocating action on the familiar themes of climate change, natural disasters, debt relief, multilateral trade, sustainable investment, and the like?
Trump’s version of the Leaders' Declaration will probably not resonate with other leaders, especially those in the Global South. Yet other leaders may accommodate Trump, as most of them tried on contentious issues in 2025. But perhaps they have had enough accommodation. If so, other leaders might boldly disagree with Trump and fashion an alternative declaration. That act of rebellion could align the stars for a train wreck in Miami.
Note
1. Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, South Korea, Mexico, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States, plus the African Union and European Union.
Data Disclosure
This publication does not include a replication package.
