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President Donald Trump presented his new tariffs on April 2 as a pragmatic, "reciprocal" trade policy intended to balance trade between the US and its trading partners. But the tariffs on imports from developing economies are neither reciprocal nor strategically sound. The new tariffs do not mirror the tariffs those countries impose on US exports, nor do they account for the vastly different economic conditions and fiscal realities that shape tariff regimes in poorer countries. Moreover, they ignore the basic realities of institutional capacity, resource endowments, and geography. Along with cuts to US development assistance, these tariffs will potentially irrevocably harm US standing in the developing world.
First, these aren't "reciprocal" tariffs. "Reciprocal" would be assessing the same tariff levels on imported products as the partner country assesses on US exports—simple tit for tat. Vietnam's average most favored nation (MFN) assessed tariff rate was 9.4 percent in 2024. A reciprocal tariff for Vietnam would thus be about 9.4 percent,1 not the 46 percent Trump announced on April 2. These new tariffs are, at best, about half the rate that would theoretically, though unrealistically, eliminate US bilateral trade deficits with these trading partners. Opinions will vary on whether that is a laudable policy goal, which it is not. Calling these tariffs reciprocal tariffs is like calling a cow a horse.
Of course, these calculated rates don't account for the fact that the tariff shock could cripple these countries' economies, driving down their demand for US exports. Demand for US exports is already limited in many developing economies because the US—befitting its status as an advanced economy—tends to export more expensive, capital-intensive goods for which demand in poorer countries is by definition limited. US agricultural exports are an exception, but demand for bulk food commodities in many developing economies is relatively weak—again, due to poverty and reliance on subsistence agriculture to put food on the table. Demand for US exports could drop further due to resulting anti-US sentiment abroad, which could lead to boycotts of US goods, such as already seen in Canada and Denmark.
Second, many developing economies have higher tariffs out of necessity, not choice. Poor countries are not just cash-strapped; they typically have a lot less administrative and bureaucratic capacity than their advanced-economy peers. Taxes that can be levied at a limited number of ports of entry are a lot easier to collect than the income, payroll, and value-added taxes that make up the bulk of the tax base in advanced economies. Of course, reliance on tariffs distorts these economies to a significant degree. Developing-economy policymakers know this. That they nevertheless keep higher tariffs in place is a sign of their challenging fiscal realities, not of a lack of trade policy acumen.
Third, the Trump administration's proposed remedy—just build and produce in the US, behind the tariff wall—is impossible to implement because developing economies export many of the raw materials and agricultural goods to the US. Take Côte d'Ivoire, which these days would probably be renamed Côte du Cacao: It's responsible for almost half of global cocoa production, and cocoa accounts for about 76 percent of Ivorian exports to the US market. This is almost entirely due to geography: Much of Côte d'Ivoire is in the sweet spot of temperature, elevation, and humidity that makes cocoa flourish.2 Cocoa comes from trees that take three to five years to begin fruiting and a decade to become fully productive. There are at most 3,500 acres of US land—all in Hawaii—that could in theory sustain cocoa production; Côte d'Ivoire has 11.8 million acres under cultivation. Offshoring the Ivorian chocolate industry to the US wouldn't just be self-negating, it's literally impossible. The new 21 percent US tariff on Ivorian goods cannot change that.
The same story holds globally for coffee, black pepper, bananas, palm oil, and a host of mineral products (many of which are exempted). While it would be unwise to use tariffs to reshore production of T-shirts and inexpensive shoes, it is at least possible. Where it is impossible because of geographic and climatic reality, there's no domestic industry promotion argument to be made.
The Trump administration sees the tariffs as a tool to generate government revenue, encourage reshoring of industry, and balance bilateral trade. There are good-faith debates to be had about the merits of these goals. But in applying exceptionally high tariffs to many developing economies that produce products with no competing US domestic industry, the tariffs will only impose costs on already poor countries that are reeling from cuts to US development assistance—and on US consumers. Moreover, they will likely shrink markets for US exports. That isn't reciprocity. And it is certainly not a recipe for promoting US national interests in the developing world.
Notes
1. I say "about" because the calculations are complicated: Different tariff lines are associated with different products, so the composition of exports and imports matters.
2. An additional 14 percent of Ivorian exports to the US market are from natural rubber, which also only grows in certain climates.
Data Disclosure
This publication does not include a replication package.
