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We believe it is important to read and take seriously what North Korea says, even if interpretation is a risky business. Moreover, we put particular weight on statements by the National Defense Commission given its organizational stature. Although the most recent NDC statement, issued on February 4, is particularly over-the-top, it does contain several important pieces of information. Or disinformation; as always, North Korea has the problem of how far it is possible escalate through such statements before the signal-to-noise ratios starts to fall.
Nonetheless, there are some things worth underlining. Perhaps the most important message in the statement is that the regime has decided to not even feign an interest in a resumption of talks, whether bilateral or multilateral. More precisely: “It is the decision of the army and people of the DPRK to have no longer need or willingness (sic) to sit at negotiating table with the U.S. since the latter seeks to stamp out the ideology of the former and "bring down" its social system.” The NDC statement thus appears to retract the offer the regime made of a nuclear test moratorium in return for a suspension of joint exercises with the South, an offer that the US rightly rejected.
The statement comes in the wake of speculation—fueled in part by the administration itself—that the US might have made an offer of talks to the North Koreans, and presumably without preconditions. While in Beijing, US Ambassador for North Korea Policy Sung Kim had these two exchanges with reporters:
QUESTION: Ambassador, there was a media report (SH: a front page story in the Dong-a Ilbo January 30) that the U.S. side offered a bilateral with North Korea in Beijing shortly before your trip here. Can you confirm and comment?
AMBASSADOR KIM: We have made it very clear publicly that we are open to engagement, substantive dialogue with North Korea about the issue of denuclearization. I don't want to get into details of diplomatic communication, but North Koreans were aware that I would be in the region and I think they understood that this would be an opportunity for substantive dialogue on the nuclear issue. But unfortunately, we are not having a meeting on this trip.
QUESTION: About the U.S.-North Korea bilat. Have you discussed with China about that, and what position do they take on that, the bilat?
AMBASSADOR KIM: Well, I think the current position among all parties, including the U.S. and China, is that we should look for opportunities for substantive engagement with North Korea. The question is not what we are willing to do, I think the question is whether the North Koreans are ready for any serious and productive discussion on the nuclear issue, and that's something that we're continuing to look for.
The statement and the rejection of talks will provide fuel to those in the US arguing that engagement is a waste of time. On that score, the timing is perfect for an event in Washington bringing together two of the top commenters on the peninsula. On Wednesday, February 11 the National Committee on North Korea (NCNK) will host Bob Carlin (a timely recent reflection on press analysis of North Korean statements can be found at 38North) and Bruce Klingner, a thoughtful skeptic at Heritage. Details are appended below.
China is also affected by this recent back and forth. Beijing has faced an uphill battle in getting any traction on its mantra to resume the Six Party Talks. Pyongyang’s rejection of the US offer—depending on the details—and the NDC statement will make it harder still, as North Korea had at least long floated its willingness to resume talks “without preconditions” (meaning that it would undertake no prior actions with respect to its nuclear program, outside of the nothing-for-something offer of a nuclear moratorium). Now, it looks like talks are being ruled out completely, as they were by North Korea in 2009.
The statement also contains amped-up rhetoric which on closer reading is largely defensive in nature (“If the U.S. ignites a war of aggression against the DPRK by conventional forces, the latter will fight the former by conventional forces of its style, if the former unleashes a nuclear war against the latter, it will counter through its own nuclear strikes, and if the former tries to bring down the latter through a cyber warfare, it will react with its own preeminent cyber warfare and will thus bring earlier the final ruin of the U.S.”) But it also contained one unfortunate comment that is of ongoing concern: where, exactly, the North Koreans are with respect to miniaturization and an effective link between their missile and nuclear efforts (“The U.S. had better clearly know that the DPRK's smaller, precision and diversified nuclear striking means…”) We don't know for sure until we see a test, but that is the point: we don’t know for sure.
Statements of this sort no doubt have domestic as well as international audiences, and this one suggests the regime sees some value of stirring up a war footing at home. But the statement also presents a list of the constraints that North Korea is seeing and feeling at the moment, even if the timing may be coincidental: the unfolding of the Commission of Inquiry process (our last post and links to others can be found here); the US reaction to the Sony hack, including new sanctions and a possible counterattack; Obama’s comments in his social media interviews that North Korea would ultimately collapse and that information strategies are fair game; the discussion around putting North Korea back on the state sponsors of terrorism list (on which more shortly in a post from Marc Noland); and the rejection of the offer to suspend regularly scheduled exercises, which North Korea always denounces. Taken together, we can see why this might add up to a hostile policy. But that interpretation sidesteps the perennial question of what Kim Jong Un really wants to accomplish; it has been unable to respond to even the simplest and least controversial of South Korean requests, such as a resumption of family reunions, despite earnest efforts on the part of the South to engage. Given the political state of play in the major parties at the moment, we don’t see any path forward unless the Park administration can pull something out of its hat; our analysis of that process can be found here.
Testing Intentions: A Debate about U.S. Strategy toward North Korea
The National Committee on North Korea (NCNK) is pleased to host a debate on U.S. engagement with North Korea between two preeminent American specialists: Bob Carlin, Visiting Scholar at Stanford University’s Center for International Security and Cooperation; and Bruce Klingner, Senior Research Fellow for Asia at The Heritage Foundation.
Among other topics, the debaters will discuss whether the United States should test North Korea’s latest offer of a nuclear test moratorium in return for the United States and South Korea not conducting this year’s planned joint military exercises.
The debate moderator will be Chris Nelson, Editor of “The Nelson Report.”
About the Debaters
Bob Carlin served as senior policy advisor at the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) from 2002-2006, leading numerous delegations to the North. From 1989 – 2002, he was chief of the Northeast Asia Division in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, U.S. Department of State. He also served as Senior Policy Advisor to the Special Ambassador for talks with North Korea. From 1971 – 1989 Carlin was an analyst at the Central Intelligence Agency. He has visited North Korea over 30 times.
Prior to joining The Heritage Foundation in 2007, Bruce Klingner served 20 years with the Central Intelligence Agency and the Defense Intelligence Agency. From 1996 to 2001, Klingner was CIA’s deputy division chief for Korea, responsible for the analysis of political, military, economic and leadership issues for the president of the United States and other policymakers. In 1993-1994 he was the chief of the CIAs Korea branch, which analyzed military developments during a nuclear crisis with North Korea.
If you would like to attend, all non-Congressional employees must RSVP by February 9. All necessary details can be found here.
