Central bank independence in practice

The Peterson Institute for International Economics held a high-level conference in October 2025 in Washington, DC, to analyze the serious issues concerning central bank independence in practice. The goal was to inform Congress, the federal courts, market participants, and the public with the latest evidence-based assessments of why the independence of the Federal Reserve should be secured and how far it should extend in practical terms. The conference convened leading voices from academia, policymaking, and finance. Their remarks and presentations are brought together in this PIIE Briefing.

Contents

Introduction: What Central Bank Independence Means and Raises
Adam S. Posen, PIIE

I Evidence on Independence: Why Is It Useful? How Does It Work?
Francesco Bianchi, Johns Hopkins University
John H. Cochrane, Hoover Institution
Randall S. Kroszner, University of Chicago Booth School of Business

II Accountability for an Independent Federal Reserve
Richard H. Clarida, PIMCO and Columbia University
Thomas Drechsel, University of Maryland

III US Legal and Constitutional Perspectives on Independence
Carola Binder, School of Civic Leadership, University of Texas at Austin
Paul Tucker, Harvard Kennedy School
Stephen I. Vladeck, Georgetown Law School

IV Independence for Monetary Policy versus Financial Regulation and Supervision
Joyce Chang, JPMorganChase
Adam S. Posen, PIIE
Amit Seru, Stanford Graduate School of Business; Hoover Institution (revised February 2026)
Daniel K. Tarullo, Harvard Law School
Carolyn A. Wilkins, Princeton University

V Policymaker Experience with Independence in Practice
Charles L. Evans, former Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
Roger W. Ferguson, Jr., PIIE Board of Directors and TIAA
Thomas Hoenig, George Mason University