Why a US-DRC minerals-for-security deal could backfire

In March 2025, the government of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) approached the Trump administration with a high-stakes proposal: a deal that would grant American firms access to the African country’s critical mineral reserves in exchange for US military assistance.

While such an agreement might appear attractive, it would come with substantial risks that echo past entanglements in complex and unstable regions. The US should instead focus on repairing relations with Canada, a critical mineral powerhouse, and engaging with countries like the DRC on economic and diplomatic terms rather than militarized ones.

The US needs critical minerals—such as lithium, uranium, and copper—for both economic resilience and national security reasons. They are required inputs for a variety of advanced energy and defense technologies. And the US is keen to reduce its dependence on China, the world’s dominant refiner of critical minerals.

The DRC’s proposal potentially could help the US diversify its sources of minerals. Supporting the DRC’s efforts to leverage its mineral wealth for growth and to provide domestic employment opportunities could also diminish the appeal of armed rebellion there.

At present, however, publicly available details of the proposed deal are scant. Reports indicate that in return for giving American firms exclusive access rights to the DRC’s critical mineral wealth and infrastructure projects, the US government would provide security assistance in the form of training, equipment, and potentially direct assistance, meaning US boots on the ground. The DRC’s initial approach was reportedly made to US Secretary of State Marco Rubio via a lobbyist on behalf of a Congolese senator.

The Value Proposition

The DRC’s mineral wealth is both vast and diverse. The nation is the world’s dominant producer of cobalt and a significant producer of copper, tantalum, diamonds, and tin. All, except for diamonds, are on US government critical minerals lists.[1] Cobalt is a key input for batteries, jet engines, and turbines; tantalum for capacitors, semiconductors, and medical implants; tin for solder, chemicals, and energy. The DRC may have significant deposits of lithium as well, though there are no active lithium mines in the country at present. Currently, most of the DRC’s cobalt and copper production is destined for refining and processing in China.

For the US, going to the source seemingly makes strategic and economic sense, especially if the goal is for the US to pivot and focus on mineral processing rather than kickstarting domestic mining. From the Congolese perspective, courting US partnerships would be a good strategy for diversifying its export destinations and diluting the influence China currently holds over the DRC’s mining sector.

In the 21st century, the US has proven much more willing than China to intervene directly in other countries, so the US could provide more decisive military support. US security assistance could help the Congolese government stabilize eastern Congo. However, the most significant cobalt and copper deposits are in the comparatively stable Lualaba and Haut-Katanga provinces, while the security challenges are mostly in North and South Kivu, some five hundred miles away. That’s a long distance in a country with some of the world’s sparsest road networks where only 2 percent are paved.

Political Context: Complicated and Violent

The Democratic Republic of Congo is among the world’s poorest and least stable countries. Most recently, in January 2025, the Congolese rebel group March 23 Movement (M23), backed by neighboring Rwanda, took control of Goma, the capital of Nord Kivu province and the easternmost major city in the DRC. Goma is home to between 800,000 and 2 million residents. Estimates range widely because Goma, like the rest of the DRC, has not had an official census since 1984[2] and is home to a large and fluid refugee and internally displaced persons (IDP) community.[3]

The DRC has been at war since 1993. Then known as Zaire, it was ruled by Joseph-Désiré Mobutu, a US-backed Cold War client who maintained power in part by stoking ethnic tensions in the mineral-rich east. As US support waned in the 1990s, Mobutu was left ruling 40 million people in a country the size of Alaska and Texas combined, with an economy half the size of Wyoming’s.

Eastern Congo soon plunged into ethnic conflict that escalated after the 1994 genocide in neighboring Rwanda.[4] Millions of Hutu refugees—including génocidaires—fled into the region as the Tutsi-led Rwandan Patriotic Front took power in the Rwandan capital Kigali. In 1997, Mobutu was ousted by Laurent-Désiré Kabila, a Congolese rebel[5], with Rwandan and Ugandan support. His ouster was the culmination of the First Congo War (1996–97). But fighting continued. The Second Congo War (1998–2003) drew in Angola, Chad, Namibia, and Zimbabwe on Kabila’s side, while Burundi, Rwanda, and Uganda backed anti-Kabila forces, leading to the deaths of nearly 6 million people.[6]

Fast forward a decade. M23 formed in 2012 from the remnants of an earlier, Tutsi-dominated Congolese rebel group, the National Congress for the Defence of the People (CNDP).[7] Both groups received/receive support from the Rwandan government, which has been accused of exploiting the instability in eastern Congo and aiding and abetting the looting of its mineral resources by armed groups. The endemic fighting and associated human rights abuses, including child and forced labor, were behind the 3TG (tin, tungsten, tantalum, and gold) provisions the US Dodd-Frank Act, which sought to keep conflict minerals from entering US supply chains.

If this situation sounds complex, that’s because it is. The DRC has five official languages, over two hundred spoken languages, and as many as two hundred fifty different ethnic groups. The physical terrain may not be as challenging as Afghanistan’s arid mountains, but the human terrain is every bit its equal, with meddling neighbors and weak central government institutions.

These challenges are a major reason Beijing has been able to build up influence over Congo’s mineral resources, as Chinese firms have historically had a greater tolerance for working in challenging, institutionally weak contexts. The Kisanfu mine has emerged as a significant producer of copper and cobalt under Chinese ownership. The concession had previously been owned by US-based Freeport-McMoRan, which sold to the Chinese mining company CMOC in 2020. Freeport-McMoRan sold Kisanfu as part of a broader strategy of divesting its African operations and to pay down debt—the latter being a much weaker constraint on China’s government-backed firms.

Big Risks

As a strategy for securing minerals, a US-DRC minerals-for-security deal would come with significant risks. The most obvious and consequential would be US forces being drawn into a complex, multiparty civil war, as happened following the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq. Both of those conflicts became quagmires, with the US ultimately withdrawing on less than ideal terms after significant US blood and treasure had been shed and spent.

Second, assuming the security situation could be improved simply through a show of force and deterrence, the business environment would be challenging. US miners, and Western miners more generally, historically have had good reasons for avoiding markets with significant risk premia and reputations for systemic corruption: The risk premia increase operating costs, and bribing foreign officials is illegal. The Trump administration recently paused enforcement of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act for 180 days, a pause that could be extended and which was deemed necessary for US firms to compete in certain markets. But the former challenge still stands, especially at a time when critical mineral margins are razor-thin because of Chinese overcapacity and pricing power, as well as the softening demand outlook as the future of US green energy transition is in doubt.

Finally, the DRC is richest in a mineral—cobalt—for which the US demand outlook is shaky. If the Inflation Reduction Act were to be repealed, future US demand for cobalt would probably be lower than previously forecast. And even if it weren’t, changes in renewable energy storage and battery technology may render cobalt not as important in the future as it has been in the recent past. Cobalt-based batteries are rapidly losing market share to cheaper lithium iron phosphate (LFP) batteries whose constituent materials are easier to source.

Diversifying US critical mineral supply chains is essential for both economic and national security. Equally important is supporting Africa’s efforts to harness its mineral wealth for sustainable growth and to create opportunities that reduce the incentives for armed rebellion. But committing US security resources, including personnel, to one of the least stable places on Earth would be a highly risky means of achieving them. The US would be better off pursuing other options.

Notes

1. All but copper are on the US Geological Survey (USGS) list; copper is designated as a critical mineral on the Department of Energy’s list.

2. A national census was planned for 2020 but was postponed because of the COVID-19 pandemic; reports indicate a census began in 2024 could be completed in 2025.

3. Refugees are individuals who cross an international border to find safety in another country, while IDPs remain within their own country's borders.

4. The Rwandan genocide occurred in 1994, when extremist members of the Hutu ethnic majority orchestrated the mass killing of around 800,000 ethnic minority Tutsi and moderate Hutu over about 100 days. The violence was fueled by ethnic tensions, demographic pressures, political instability, and propaganda. The international community largely failed to intervene.

5. Laurent Kabila was a Congolese revolutionary who led a rebel movement that overthrew longtime dictator Mobutu Sese Seko in 1997, fueled by popular discontent and support from neighboring Rwanda and Uganda. He would be president of the DRC until 2001, when he was assassinated by a member of his personal guard.

6. These estimates are based on excess deaths, encompassing both direct combat and violence against civilians, as well as deaths from starvation and disease. Combat-related deaths likely totaled between 300,000 and 400,000, though many fighters were irregulars, including rebels and paramilitaries.

7. The CNDP ceased its rebellion on March 23, 2009. The M23 takes its name from that date.