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In case you missed it—and we would be worried if you didn’t—there was an interesting exchange between State Department spokeswoman Victoria Nuland and a reporter over food aid to the DPRK and Somalia.
We have pointed out that pressures from the Horn of Africa will inevitably affect responsiveness to the WFP’s Korean appeal. But this persistent reporter was making another link: whether we were being more lax in our approach to monitoring the delivery of food in Somalia than in North Korea.
We have already had our say on monitoring of the current WFP program; despite the ongoing problems, the agreement looked like an improvement over what went before.
But the Somalia case raises another set of complexities. The famine in Somalia has been caused in part by the unwillingness of Al-Shabaab to allow food aid into areas under its control; the US has repeatedly called on al-Shabaab to relent. But even were the militant group to acquiesce, US NGOs fear legal risk because al-Shabaab is classified as a terrorist organization; at least in theory, diversion of aid to them could be interpreted as violating the law. In July, the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) suggested that it would shield NGOs dependent solely on US government grants from legal action. Mercy Corps, which relies on private as well as public funding, took the lead in filing for an application for a blanket license from OFAC that would protect such NGOs as well.
On the topic of Al-Shabaab, NPR conducted an interview back in July with Joel Charny from InterAction regarding the concerns expressed by the US government about the safety of working within Somalia. Although Charny downplayed the US government's concerns, it is not hard to fathom the reluctance of the government to support a program that could result in aid workers being killed or captured. As bad as the North Koreans are, no one expects them to kidnap or kill NGO staff and that is a legitimate tilting point in favor of North Korea.
Nuland was pressed on the comparison, admitting that such licenses had been issued to NGOs working in Somalia on a case-by-case basis. But are we really more likely to prevent diversion to al-Shahaab than to the North Korean military? And if not, isn’t this a pretty clear indication that the judgment on North Korean food aid is linked to the talks? Well, we have made that point already. You be the judge; the relevant section of the press conference is appended below.
Victoria Nuland
Spokesperson
Daily Press Briefing
Washington, DC
October 25, 2011
QUESTION: -- it’s been months since these aid groups have talked about a dire need in North Korea. Does that mean that the United States doesn’t see it as an – as urgent of an issue as they see it?
MS. NULAND: Again, we are continuing to evaluate the need. We’re continuing to talk to everybody, including these aid groups, and we’ll let you know when we have a decision to announce.
QUESTION: When you brought up the Horn of Africa and competing needs, are you suggesting that the U.S. food aid to North Korea might be hampered or constrained in some way because of the amount that you’re sending to the Horn?
MS. NULAND: No. I didn’t mean to make that – draw that direct link. I simply said that we look at the full global --
QUESTION: Okay.
MS. NULAND: -- need in making these decisions. It’s one of the factors that goes into our decision making.
QUESTION: And in terms of monitoring, in the Horn of Africa, you’ve actually relaxed restrictions on where that food aid can go, who can get to it, because there were concerns from NGOs about al-Shabaab getting control of it, using it to feed themselves instead of the people who really needed it. It seems to me roughly – there is a foreign terrorist organization. In North Korea, you’re talking about the army. North Korea is no longer a state sponsor of terrorism. Why are you willing to ease the rules to get food quickly to Somalia and the Horn of Africa and not to North Korea? It seems to me to just fly in the face of the rejection of – that this is a political argument. In other words, if you’re prepared to ease the rules to get food to one place, why aren’t you prepared to do the same for another place, unless it is a political decision?
MS. NULAND: Again, if and when we make a decision to move forward with this, we have to have an agreement with the Government of the DPRK how the monitoring will go. DPRK is a government entity that controls its borders, controls access to its population.
QUESTION: So the TFG does not --
MS. NULAND: We have an opportunity here to have an agreement that can satisfy us, if and when we decide to move forward. In the context of al-Shabaab, there’s not a partner that’s reliable that you could negotiate with. The circumstances are apples and oranges.
And again, we haven’t made --
QUESTION: So you think that --
MS. NULAND: Can I finish?
QUESTION: -- the Government of North Korea is a reliable partner, that they always do what you --
MS. NULAND: Can I finish?
QUESTION: Yeah.
MS. NULAND: We haven’t made any decisions yet, either about food aid or about what’ll be required on monitoring. What we have looked at was the insufficiencies of the regime the last time we did this. So --
QUESTION: What about the insufficiency of food?
MS. NULAND: Again, we are continuing to talk to all of the --
QUESTION: It seems to me if there are people starving in two places and you’re willing to ease the rules to go give food to one place, you might as well – the only reason you wouldn’t be willing to ease the rules to go to another place is that it’s a political reason, which is fine. It just seems to me odd that you deny it when it appears clearly that that’s what’s the case here.
MS. NULAND: If and when we decide to go forward with this, we want to make sure that the food goes to the people who need it, not to the regime, and not to go locked up in storehouses. So if and when we get to that stage, that’ll be the conversation that we will have. It’s not a matter of easing or tightening; it’s a matter of having an agreement about how we get it to the right people.
QUESTION: But you’re okay if Shabaab gets some of the food that – U.S. food that --
MS. NULAND: We are doing everything we can --
QUESTION: -- while they blow up things and attack.
MS. NULAND: We are doing everything we can with our NGO partners to work with those who are reliable and to try to get the food to as many people as they can.
QUESTION: Well, I thought there was this big announcement, not so long ago, about how the restrictions were being eased and how NGOs wouldn’t be punished if --
MS. NULAND: That’s – no, but see, that’s a different matter, Matt. Because what we’re talking about in the case of Somalia is that we have issued more licenses to more U.S. NGOs --
QUESTION: Right.
MS. NULAND: -- after working with them individually --
QUESTION: Right.
MS. NULAND: -- on their chain of custody of aid --
QUESTION: Right.
MS. NULAND: -- and on the procedures that they use. So in that case, the negotiations have gone forward with the NGO groups to our satisfaction, so what we been easing is that we’ve been giving more licenses to more groups as they --
QUESTION: Right.
MS. NULAND: -- establish --
QUESTION: So why don’t you do the same with North Korea?
MS. NULAND: Can I finish, please?
QUESTION: Yeah.
MS. NULAND: As they establish their ability to make sure it gets to people in need. So –
QUESTION: So why don’t you do the same in North Korea?
MS. NULAND: Again, if and when we make that decision, we’ll have a conversation about how we ensure chain of custody on the –
QUESTION: Does the United States agree that people are starving in North Korea?
MS. NULAND: We are continuing to evaluate the need situation in North Korea. Are we –
QUESTION: Just a follow-up on this, please?
MS. NULAND: Yeah.
QUESTION: Is the purpose of U.S. food aid to ease human suffering abroad?
MS. NULAND: Yes.
QUESTION: Okay. So we’ve established that.
If – given that it is your intent in food aid to ease human suffering abroad, why, as a matter of common sense, would you not engage on both tracks at the same time; track one being figuring out what the need is and what the competing needs are, and track two being, look, if we’re going to go ahead and do this, we need to make sure that there is proper chain of custody and we have adequate monitoring and evaluation safeguards in place, so that once you make the decision on point A, there is no extended period of time for where people are going to continue to starve, and at a rate, apparently, worse than elsewhere in the world before food arrives?
Why, as a matter of common sense, if the intent is to reduce human suffering, you wouldn’t do both?
MS. NULAND: Well, we’re certainly proceeding on both tracks with regard to our internal review – first of all, evaluating the need, secondarily establishing what we will need to ensure this program is successful and meets people in need if we go forward. With regard to having a detailed conversation with the government, that only makes sense if you are going to proceed to go forward, because otherwise you raise expectations when we haven’t made a decision with regard to need and with regard to moving forward.
QUESTION: Well, how does it raise expectations if you say, “Look, we haven’t made a decision here. So don’t get your hopes up. But if we do make a decision, we don’t want there to be this lengthy period of time between when we make up our minds and we negotiate a monitoring and evaluation protocol, during which time, presumably, there will be more human suffering than there would have been if you guys had the bandwidth to do this at the same time”?
MS. NULAND: Let me just say that the way this could and should proceed, if and when we’re going to go forward, is relatively straight forward and relatively easy to implement with goodwill on the receiving side. So it’s not as if we think that we would need to have an extensive negotiation if, in fact, the partner country is prepared to let the goods go to the right people. So I don’t think that one should be looking at this as a potential to delay if and when we make the decision, and it’s not as if we have never had a conversation with North Korea about what went wrong the last time and what we consider to have been substandard procedures in the past.
