Key Takeaways
- The Trump administration's grant of a US Treasury swap line to Argentina in 2025 and the United Arab Emirates' recent request for a Federal Reserve swap line highlight the danger that the United States uses dollar liquidity more frequently as a tool of foreign policy.
- The US government's two main channels for providing dollar liquidity abroad are the Treasury's Exchange Stabilization Fund (ESF) and the Fed.
- ESF credit operations have often been deployed with geopolitical considerations in mind since the 1930s, while Fed swap lines have been reserved for defending the dollar or fighting global financial crises.
- Newly appointed Fed chair Kevin Warsh has suggested that the Fed should defer to the Treasury in the realm of "economic statecraft," while also negotiating a "new Treasury-Fed accord" to agree on the size and composition of the Fed's balance sheet.
- Excessive politicization of Treasury or Fed swap lines would carry risks for the dollar's dominant international status, and making the Fed an adjunct to economic statecraft would damage its independence and credibility.
- The Treasury should be the main responder when geopolitical objectives are dominant, while the Fed maintains its independence.
Over the past century, the United States has provided dollar liquidity abroad through both the US Treasury and the Federal Reserve, but the appropriate mode of liquidity injection depends on the economic, financial, and geopolitical contexts. The Treasury is the more appropriate lending conduit when geopolitical concerns dominate, while Fed dollar provision should primarily be targeted toward global stability objectives and be more insulated from short-term foreign policy motives. Up to now, political abuses of these foreign lending channels have been constrained to some degree by laws, norms, and intergovernmental understandings, but adherence can no longer be assumed, so more formal guardrails are needed.
Data Disclosure:
Related Documents
- Documentpb26-9.zip (22.24 KB)