The US intervention in Venezuela, attacks on vessels in the Caribbean, financial squeeze on Cuba, and its bailout of Argentina should perhaps have come as no surprise. After all, the Trump administration has made no secret of its intentions, as laid out in the 2025 National Security Strategy (NSS) document: To "reassert and enforce the 'Monroe Doctrine' to preserve U.S. preeminence in the [Western] Hemisphere and deny outside powers control of strategic locations and assets."
President James Monroe propounded the "Monroe Doctrine" in 1823, aimed at keeping European colonial powers out of the region. Today, however, by "outside powers," the Trump administration means China. Over many years, China has greatly expanded its economic and political influence in the Western Hemisphere. The problem with Trump's latter day Monroe Doctrine is that Chinese influence is so extensive that efforts to curb it could destabilize countries reliant on Chinese investments, infrastructure projects, imports, and markets.
Though the interventions are dressed up as support for free markets and opposition to outside influence, the economic incentives are obvious. The capture of President Nicolás Maduro in Venezuela is now paving the way for the United States to line up investors to exploit the country's vast oil reserves. The $20 billion bailout of Argentina is advertised as getting access to its critical minerals. Most recently, US pressure to evict a Chinese company from the Panama Canal is also clearly aimed at preserving exclusive US commercial access.
It would certainly appear that the administration is currently achieving the goals set out in the NSS, entrenching Latin America as the main stage for a geopolitical confrontation between the United States and China. But these actions could also introduce further turbulence into a region mired in political and economic problems.
China is heavily invested in Latin America through various channels, notably its "green" Belt and Road Initiative. The framework has enabled China's public banks and state-owned enterprises to underwrite massive projects in renewable energy sources, critical minerals, and infrastructure. It is estimated that since 2010, China has invested around $35 billion in renewable energy projects alone. The figure does not include the $1.3 billion spent to finance the massive Port of Chancay in Peru, which connects South America's Pacific Coast to Shanghai. The port has been the target of the Trump administration, which, in recent days, warned the Peruvian government that "cheap Chinese money costs sovereignty."
The latest sign that the administration has racked up some victories at China's expense in the region was Panama's Supreme Court ruling on the activities of Hong Kong–based CK Hutchinson regarding its role in the Panama Canal. CK Hutchinson's Panama Ports Company (PPC) had operated the canal's Balboa (Pacific) and Cristóbal (Atlantic) terminals since 1997, with a 25-year extension of the concession granted in 2021.
At the end of January, Panama's Supreme Court overturned the PPC contract, ruling that the concession's terms were unconstitutional, sparking outrage from the company's leadership, which had been in the process of yielding to US pressure and selling its controlling port interests to a consortium led by the US investment firm BlackRock. At the beginning of February, the Chinese government escalated its condemnation of the court's decision, underscoring the strategic nature of the Panama Canal for both the United States and China.
To be sure, China's reliance on the Panama Canal is not nearly as great as that of the United States. Much of China's trade with Latin America, particularly with South America, relies on other ports in the region, including the recently inaugurated Port of Chancay, which is 60 percent owned by the state-owned Chinese company COSCO Shipping Ports Limited. That said, control of both ends of the canal by CK Hutchinson was strategically important for China as tensions with the United States escalated over the past several years. Hence, the ruling dealt an important blow to China's interests in the region.
The same economic rationale applies to the US operation in Venezuela. As of the beginning of 2026, US energy secretary Chris Wright, a former CEO of a fracking company, made clear on a visit to Caracas in February that the US goal is to gain a foothold in the country's vast oil reserves rather than helping Venezuela transition to democracy after decades of dictatorship. Although there are few specific details about China's involvement in the Venezuelan oil sector, it is widely known that significant portions of Venezuela's oil revenues have gone to China, primarily to repay the substantial debts the South American nation owes to its Asian partner. With US control of the Venezuelan oil sector, it is now doubtful that China will be reimbursed for its hefty lending operations to the Venezuelan government.
Although the impact on China's interests in Argentina is less direct than in Panama or Venezuela, US financial backing for President Javier Milei has paved the way for strategic partnerships over the fate of the country's critical mineral reserves. In early February, the governments of both countries announced the launch of a strategic framework targeting critical minerals supply chains. China is a key investor in Argentina's critical minerals sector, particularly in lithium, where Chinese companies are involved in 6 of the country's 16 lithium projects.
Thus far, actions by the United States in these countries have not sparked much of a backlash from China. However, an emboldened US administration will continue its plans not only to increase presence in the region but also to secure strategic assets and natural resources, as laid out in the NSS. It is difficult to imagine that these goals will not meet with Chinese resistance, setting the region up as the main global stage for the inevitable face-off with Beijing.
But Latin America has enough troubles, economically and politically, and it can ill afford the massive domestic disturbances in individual countries that a confrontation might invite. Forcing countries to choose partners is a dangerous game. The region's fragile hold on much-needed foreign direct investment rests on its ability to maintain both the United States and China as investment and trade partners.
Accordingly, the aggressive push by the United States to curb or even push out China could come at the expense of Latin America's political and economic stability. Paradoxically, if the Trump administration is successful in maintaining its short-term "winning streak" in imposing what has become known as the "Donroe Doctrine," it could lead to a Pyrrhic victory that ultimately undermines its stated goals of securing strategic assets and resources to meet its own needs.
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