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Trying to follow North Korea has one hardship component: actually reading what the North Koreans say. No matter how committed we are, there is only so much of the Korean Central News Agency any human can take (Lead story today: Kim Yong Nam Greets Cameroonian President). But in fact, it is very important to listen to what your adversaries are saying, particularly the Foreign Ministry. These statements are typically very finely wrought reflections of North Korean thinking that bear serious decoding.
Peter Hayes and Scott Bruce have done North Korea watchers a service by gathering together a collection of these statements on the always-useful Nautilus Institute website. The collection provides the supporting material for their interesting take on North Korean nuclear intentions, which we blogged on earlier. The material is grouped by major events, beginning with the ill-fated Kelly visit and running through 2009-2010.
Among our favorites is a Foreign Ministry statement released under the title “Conclusion of non-aggression treaty between DPRK and U.S. called for” on October 25, 2002. The statement refers to recent reforms and expresses puzzlement that the United States has not paid any attention to them:
“The DPRK has taken a series of new steps in economic management and adopted one measure after another to reenergize the economy, including the establishment of a special economic region, in conformity with the changed situation and specific conditions of the country.
These developments practically contribute to peace in Asia and the rest of the world.
Almost all the countries except for the United States, therefore, welcomed and hailed them, a great encouragement to the DPRK.”
Regardless of what the North Koreans were doing with respect to enrichment, there can be little doubt that the North Koreans saw their 2002 reforms, however limited, as a signal of a shift in intent. Rather than having the intended effect, the hardline policy of the Bush administration pushed relations toward the crisis.
The collection is light on statements from 2009-2010, although these are critically important for gauging current intent. For example, John DeLury and Chung-in Moon, in an important pro-engagement post on 38 North, see the North Koreans as always willing to strike a deal. In a monograph to be released by the East West Center this week, Marc Noland and I marshal evidence that the willingness to return to the Six Party Talks is much less clear. Nonetheless, Hayes and Bruce provide a good first cut at important North Korean statements from the onset of the crisis.
