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On a quick trip to Washington to participate in a day-long seminar organized by State, I had a chance to touch base with Dan Pinkston of the International Crisis Group. If you are looking for a succinct—but very downbeat—assessment of the state of play on the peninsula, Dan has produced it here; without naming names it generally comported with the group wisdom at the meeting.
Pinkston is of the school that if you want to understand the North Koreans, you should read what they say. And what they say is that the Six Party Talks are “permanently” dead. The reasons are to be found in the domestic political role nuclear weapons have come to play—and with respect to both elites and masses—now institutionalized in the byungjin line. The report also walks briefly through the divergent positions of the five parties on the talks, noting the possibility that Russia might subtly shift course toward more support for North Korea in the post-Crimea, post-Ukraine international landscape.
Pinkston argues strongly that it is important not to validate North Korea’s nuclear status through government-to-government initiatives. To the contrary, he subtitles one section “Fallback: Deterrence and Containment” and makes a nuanced argument for deploying THAAD (during a lull in tensions; on an announced schedule; with assurances to China). He also cautions against forms of economic engagement that will validate the byungjin bet: that Pyongyang can sustain its weapons program and successfully pursue growth-oriented reforms. But he does make the case for the long-game of “principled engagement” in other forms, particularly international organizations and civil society engagement that gets North Koreans out of the country. This is not unfamiliar territory, but Pinkston summarizes it all well and with the appropriate level of melancholy.
