On April 26, 2004, Senator John Kerry released his six-point trade pro- gram, “Trade Enforcement: Asleep at the Wheel,” and conspicuously targeted China for violating worker rights, dumping, and supporting “illegal currency manipulation” (Kerry 2004). Five days earlier, senior Bush administration officials met with Chinese Vice Premier Wu Yi to settle a few trade disputes (e.g., WiFi) but did not resolve the most contentious ones (exchange rates, semiconductors, and labor rights).
US-China relations are often in the spotlight during presidential election years, and 2004 is no exception. Ever since President Richard Nixon’s celebrated trip to Beijing in 1972, the party out of power has chastised the White House for being “soft on China”—in security terms, economic terms, or both. In turn, the ad- ministration insists that it is both tough and diplomatic. During the 2004 political season, the growing bilateral trade deficit (about $125 billion in 2003) and the loss of US manufacturing jobs (2.8 million between 2000Q2 and 2003Q3) provide topi- cal themes for the familiar drama.
