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Enough of food and human rights, already. This week we turn to some weighty military issues that deserve attention, starting with the military balance. Tony Cordesman at the Center for Strategic and International Studies is known for his wordy but thorough documentation of the twists and turns of the Iraq war. Over the summer, he and his colleagues have weighed in with a similarly sprawling assessment entitled The Korean Military Balance. It serves as a complement to a recent net assessment by the International Institute of Strategic Studies (see our review of that effort here).
The report collates a number of existing estimates of forces and includes not only North and South Korean militaries, but also those of China, Japan and Taiwan as well. You want to know the number of armored fighting vehicles or fixed wing aircraft and of what sort? You got it. There is also a chapter that provides an overview of US forces in the region and sections on the nuclear and chemical programs.
But the central thrust of the report is the need to get beyond old-fashioned assessments of the conventional balance, a la the “Fulda Gap” analysis of high Cold War. As the report notes, “there is no reason to assume that any new Korean War would involve the total commitment of the conventional forces of each side [or] would separate the use of conventional welfare from asymmetric warfare.” This observation is not necessarily a source of optimism, since such asymmetric conflicts could escalate given North Korean propensity for risk-taking and possible misperception about likely South Korean responses.
And as with all of the military thinking about the region these days, there is no reason to assume that the conflict “could be decoupled from the deterrent and war-limiting impact of the facts that the DPRK has nuclear and chemical weapons, and that both the US and China are major regional nuclear powers.” (p. 20).
A few things that caught our eye:
- The North Koreans claim that they spend 15.8% of their stagnant or declining GDP on the military. South Korean sources suggest that spending has been rising over the last five years as a share of GDP and may now account for as much as 22% of total output. A purchasing power parity (PPP) estimate puts North Korean GDP at $40 billion--if you can believe it--which would put military spending at $9 billion or so PPP. Whatever the numbers, it is clearly an incredible drain on the country’s economic capabilities.
- The Yeongpyeong shelling showed audacity, but less remarked was the revealed weakness in artillery capabilities. More than half of all fired shells landing in the water. The problems could have to do with either training of artillery forces, guidance capacities or quality and storage of shells themselves. But as has long been known, the North Koreans make up for lack of quality with sheer mass; the KPA has at least 8500 artillery pieces—other sources put the number higher—with the majority of them forward-deployed.
- These capabilities have been augmented by an increase in special forces designed for infiltration in the event of a major conflict. Such forces are now estimated by the South Koreans to number as many as 200,000, roughly double the US estimate.
- The reason for the difference is the way that the two allies assess certain light infantry forces. According to the report, the most significant change in North Korean force planning over the last decade has been an expansion of division-level light infantry units following a strategic review that drew lessons from the Balkans, Iraq and Afghanistan. These numbers are probably inflated; you need to look at the number of small subs and AN-2 aircraft to figure out how many of such forces could really be inserted and at what stage in the conflict. But the point is that North Korean war-planning is changing.
- The South Koreans have hardly been sitting still; the Cheonan and Yeonpyeong were major shocks. In addition to wrangling over the purchase of Global Hawks the report notes that Seoul has been lobbying the U.S. for revisions to a bilateral agreement—still classified--that purportedly limits the range of ballistic missiles to a 300km range and 500kg payload. According to an informant in Seoul, ROK interpretations of the Missile Technology Control Regime’s limits on cruise missiles are also “liberal.” In addition, the report notes an interest in greater defense cooperation with Israel, including purchase of drones, radar, and possibly even missile defense capabilities.
Yet perhaps the most revealing feature of the report is that the last chapter--“The Broader Balance of WMD, Missile and Strategic Forces”—focuses largely on China. It raises the thorny issue of extended deterrence that we will be taking up in other posts this week. The changes in Chinese capabilities are well-known but their implications for the Korean peninsula are just beginning to get attention. According to the Cordesman group, the US National Military Strategy for 2011 does not make specific mention of China’s role in the Korean balance. But more focused assessments, including DoD’s annual Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China are sharply focused on potential implications for Northeast Asia of Chinese efforts at what defense wonks have labeled “anti-access/area denial” (A2/AD) strategies.
