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Our assessment of Secretary Clinton’s pre-APEC speech at the East-West Center hinges on the answer to some simple but crucial questions. Is it good that the US is announcing a “pivot” to East Asia? Or is it in fact a sign of neglect and how far US foreign policy has strayed from core interests? We tilt toward the second of these interpretations, but better late than never.
Clinton begins by drawing a parallel with Europe that is not a propos. The transatlantic institutions that she sets up as a model were anchored in two multilateral efforts—NATO and the European community—that are not likely to be replicated. References to a new “architecture” in the region seem far-fetched to us.
In fact, the core components of the new strategy are long-standing elements of US policy toward the region, with minor twists. Her six “key lines of action” are:
- Strengthening our bilateral security alliances—including their operational infrastructure--with Japan as the “cornerstone.”
- Deepening our working relationships with emerging powers. Indonesia and India getting special mention, suggesting a geostrategic vision that also undergirds our support for the East Asian Summit effort.
- Engaging with regional multilateral institutions. The main effort here is to keep alive regional institutions that are trans-Pacific (TPP, APEC, EAS) rather than intra-Asian (the core “ASEAN+” machinery) in nature. The Secretary also emphasized a “rules-based”order—presumably in contrast to ad hoc dispute settlement—and the ultimate objective of a trans-Pacific FTA.
- Expanding trade and investment. Reference is made to “building on the momentum” of the KORUS, but it is not clear what is in the queue and in any case that agreement was initiated by the Bush administration. The TPP is a woefully thin reed.
- Forging a broad-based military presence, with more “widely distributed” forces.
- Advancing democracy and human rights. Secretary Clinton has always had an expansive vision of our diplomacy in this regard, including a strong interest in engaging civil society; her Foreign Affairs piece of last year spells it out. Interestingly, one of the only mentions that North Korea gets is in this context.
China receives separate treatment, but the agenda is predictable: trade and the exchange rate; “strategic ambiguity” on Taiwan (reaffirming both the commitment to its security and the one China policy; human rights.
We do not want to sound overly cynical. The Secretary is right that it is long-past time to look beyond Iraq and Afghanistan, the starting premise of the speech. We believe in the multilateral forums that are driving the president’s Asia trip and the importance of restating our commitments and interests in the region. The Secretary is right that this formula has been a successful one.
But the internal preoccupations—the budget, including potential military cuts, ongoing economic uncertainty and elections—all bode poorly for any dramatic follow-up on this agenda. And the core question remains: if we have to remind the region of our significance, is it a good or a bad sign?
