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No sooner had I reviewed Ken Gause’s excellent House of Cards on the North Korean leadership then the newswires were abuzz with rumors of fresh purges in North Korea. The Wall Street Journal headline was the breathiest, with a subtitle that “Senior official appears to miss key gathering, sparking speculation over his fate and regime stability.”
Time to push the pause button.
What do we actually know? Actually, not that much. The origins of the story are both South Korean intelligence sources and independent regime watchers. The regime typically announces “funeral committees” around the deaths of prominent officials. When Ri Ul-sol died last week, Choe Ryong Hae was not on the committee despite his standing as one of Kim Jong Un’s closest advisors. Ri, 94 at the time of his death, was a soldier who had ascended to the rank of marshal and could trace a direct lineage back to Kim Il Sung. Such a figure would draw a high-powered group, and Kim Jong Un did in fact attend the funeral with an entourage that reflects the current power structure; the top of the list is appended below and we will review it in more detail next week.
But the press coverage we have with respect to Choe’s whereabouts seem more speculative than based on clear intelligence. Or—more accurately—we don’t know which intelligence is most likely to be true. The Korea Times cites the Asahi Shinbun to the effect that Choe “may have been relieved of his post as secretary of the Central Committee of the Workers' Party and may be performing hard labor at a collective farm.” Yonhap, by contrast, citing unnamed South Korean intelligence sources, claims that Choe “is receiving education [or re-education in some other accounts] at Kim Il Sung Higher Party School,” hardly the same as the gulag. Yet another (unnamed) source that approached me independently reports that Choe had been injured in an auto accident and could not attend the funeral because he had been hospitalized. Who knows?
Who is Choe Ryong Hae? As always, Michael Madden's North Korea Leadership Watch is a good place to start for the complete picture. Choe is the son of Choe Hyon, a guerrilla who fought with Kim Il Sung and later became Minister of the People's Armed Forces. Choe Ryong Hae served in the military relatively briefly in the 1970s but did not have a significant military background. But in the most recent period, Choe’s ups and downs have been watched closely because of the pivotal role he appeared to play in the transition, during which surprisingly few of the regents installed by Kim Jong Il managed to survive.
Despite—or perhaps because—of his lack of military background, Choe was chosen for a highly sensitive position responsible for maintaining political loyalty in the military: head of the KPA General Political Bureau. This crucial bureau was headed by a single individual—General Jo Myong Rok—from 1995 to 2010 (Jo was the military figure who visited the US and shook hands with Clinton—and in uniform—and in 2009 was appointed First Secretary of the National Defense Commission). Following Jo's death there was a nearly one-and-a-half year period when the post was vacant and the bureau was run by second-in-command Kim Jong Gak.
The position was ultimately filled by Choe. This move was interpreted as reflecting an effort to assert party-civilian control over the military. Before the September 2010 Party Conference, Choe was elevated to a general rank as a prelude to his appointment as head of the General Political Bureau in April 2012. But that wasn’t all. In the “interlocking directorate” fashion in which the North Korean system is governed, Choe also rose from alternate Politburo status to a member of the Presidium, was made a vice chairman of the Central Military Commission and was even promoted to the rank of Vice Marshal before taking over the General Political Bureau.
One of the clearest indications of Choe’s status had to do with his role managing the China portfolio. He undertook what was not doubt a particularly difficult mission to Beijing in early 2013 to clean up the mess created by the time of troubles that followed in the wake of the last round of missile and nuclear tests.
So why I am being cautious about this news? In late 2014, there were also rumors that Choe had been purged only for him to resurface. According to the recent spate of reports, he was seen on television only days before he was reportedly purged. Moreover, I am skeptical—even if true—that these court-politics moves necessarily have much enduring significance for the stability of the regime. I side strongly with those that see the succession of purges as a predictable outcome of the succession process. If anything, the ability to murder an uncle or demote a close aid is a sign of strength, not weakness. If it in fact has happened, that is.
Kim Jong Un’s Top Entourage at the Ri Ul-sol Funeral
김영남, Kim Yong Nam
황병서, Hwang Pyong So
박봉주, Pak Pong Ju
김기남, Kim Ki Nam
박영식, Pak Yong Sik
리영길, Ri Yong Gil
김원홍, Kim Won Hong
김양건, Kim Yang Gon
곽범기, Kwak Pom Gi
오수용, O Su Yong
최부일, Choe Pu Il
로두철, Roh Tu Chol
조연준, Cho Yon Jun
김영대, Kim Yong Dae
