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The Chosun Ilbo has summarized a survey of 500 refugee/defectors in South Korea conducted by the Network for North Korean Democracy and Human Rights which found that 78 percent of the respondents reported not receiving international food aid while in North Korea. This is in the same ballpark as two earlier surveys, one conducted in China, the other in South Korea. In Witness to Transformation: Refugee Insights into North Korea we summarize the situation thusly:
In both the China-based and South Korea–based surveys, an astonishing share of respondents, roughly half of those surveyed, revealed that they were unaware of the long-standing, large-scale program (table 3.1). Moreover, among respondents who indicated knowledge of the effort, 33 percent of the South Korea survey respondents and only 4 percent of the China survey respondents believed that they had been recipients. Looking only at urban residents (those on the agricultural cooperatives would have been less likely to receive aid), only 3 percent in the China survey and 14 percent of the later, South Korea survey reported being recipients.
However, the new survey reports something even more astonishing: “Of 106 respondents who did receive such aid, 29 said they returned whole or part of the aid” apparently after international monitors had departed.
When asked where the aid went, few of the respondents in any of these surveys thought that the common people had benefitted; large majorities thought that the aid went to the military or other connected groups. According to the Chosun llbo: “Some 73.6 percent believed that food aid went to the military, followed by party leaders (69 percent), government agencies (48.8 percent) and the privileged (38.8 percent). Only 2 percent believed it went to vulnerable children. Multiple answers were allowed.”
Again, these figures track the ones obtained in our surveys very closely:
The refugees overwhelmingly believed that the aid went primarily to the military (table 3.2). The question and possible responses were posed slightly differently in the two surveys, but the results are consistent. When asked who received food aid, and allowing multiple responses, 89 percent of the refugees in China who were aware of the program believed that it went to the military and 27 percent said that it went to government officials; less than 3 percent said it went to common citizens or others. When asked in the South Korea survey who the primary recipient of aid was—not allowing multiple responses—67 percent said the military, 27 percent said high-level government or party officials, 2 percent said local government or party officials, and 2 percent said the general public…
For their part, the refugees surveyed by the Network for North Korean Democracy and Human Rights evince considerable skepticism about aid: “Asked what will happen in the North if the South resumes food aid, 49.4 percent said there will be no change at all, and 44.8 percent the North will return to hardline policies. Some 75.2 percent said the South should not give the North food aid yet, while a mere 8.4 percent supported the idea.”
For our part, we conclude:
These responses do not prove that the aid was diverted to the military and officials. But at a minimum, the responses attest both to the perceived power and centrality of the military in North Korean life and to the regime’s control over information and resources. In the context of a massive, decade-long multinational humanitarian aid program, North Korean refugees exhibit a significant lack of awareness of the overall aid effort. Their overwhelming impression is that the primary beneficiaries of the aid effort were the military. These findings ought to give significant pause when designing a relief program for North Korea or arguing for the “soft power” benefits of supplying aid. Aid almost certainly has had positive effects for North Korea: by hitting some targeted beneficiaries, by raising aggregate supply, and by lowering prices. But many North Koreans in our surveys didn’t know about the aid effort and those who did appear to believe that aid was largely diverted to the military. The refugees’ responses call into question the effectiveness of past aid programs in reaching intended targets and particularly the ability of those programs to generate goodwill, especially when the regime depicts the foreign aid donations as a kind of political tribute.
