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One outcome of the August 25 Agreement was a joint commitment to resume high-level talks “in Pyongyang or Seoul at an early date to improve the north-south ties and have multi-faceted dialogue and negotiations in the future.” Among the issues mentioned elsewhere in the six-point agreement were a resumption of family visits and revitalizing NGO exchanges. The agreement comes in the wake of a subtle turn in Park Geun Hye’s Trustpolitik toward engagement, visible in the activities of the Presidential Committee on Unification Preparation in which Marc Noland and I have participated both in the US and Seoul (see Marc’s posts here and here). In contrast to the Dresden speech, with its more or less open expectation of ultimate absorption, the committee has been emphasizing “peaceful unification,” in effect détente. South Korea had proposed talks at several points before North Korea finally came back with the proposal that led to the meeting over the weekend.
The North Koreans did come to the table, but the talks yielded nothing. What is interesting is that the two accounts of the breakdown actually line up pretty closely. The Northern account claimed that the agreement allowed for any issue to be raised, and as a result Pyongyang made a proposal that family reunions be exchanged for a reopening of Mt. Kumgang.
But as the very straightforward Southern press release noted, family reunions should be treated as a humanitarian issue on its own merits. Moreover, Kumgang could not be reopened until the issue of security was resolved. Seoul offered to set up negotiations to address the issue, but the North demurred. The South has insisted that three things happen before the resort can reopen, although it is clear some could be finessed: a formal probe on the 2008 shooting incident, security guarantees, and perhaps most importantly public assurances that it won’t happen again. North Korea believes that all of these issues are moot because of assurances provided by Kim Jong Il to the Hyundai Group chair back in 2009 (Hankyoreh in Korean here).
The MOU press release offered a clear summary of the South’s agenda:
“…our main focus lied [sic] on 1) resolving the separated families issues by confirming the fate of family members, exchanging letters and other measures, 2) opening up the three channels for cooperation – environment, livelihood, and culture, 3) constructing the DMZ World Eco-Peace Park, and 4) resolving the 3C questions (Commuting, Communication and Customs) of the [Kaesong Industrial Complex].”
This focus on low-risk—and low-cost—functional issues is very much at the heart of the entire Trustpolitik approach, but was dismissed by the North as small bore, irrelevant and insulting.
But the real issue was identified pretty clearly in the KCNA account. North Korea was piqued that a conservative media outlet in the South had called out North Korean motives: to get the cashflow of Kumgang rolling again, a task no doubt made more urgent by the constraints the country is facing from the slowdown of growth in China. I have argued at some length that the post-Cheonan May 24 sanctions should be lifted, but precisely so that North-South relations can be put on a more commercial footing. If discussions of Kumgang are resumed, the whole contract should be reconsidered. The private parties and North Korea—rather than South Korean taxpayers—should be shouldering the risk and Pyongyang’s claims to the assets on the site need to be rescinded. But this would require serious negotiation and is not the type of arrangement that North Korea wants. Funneling tens of millions of dollars in payments to the North Korean regime for a facility Pyongyang has effectively expropriated in exchange for family visits is not “building trust;” it’s extortion. Next stage in the game? Alastair Gale at the Wall Street Journal pulls together the concerns over a missile or even nuclear test.
