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Given the scant information we have on the North Korean leadership, the community of North Korea watchers has often resorted to Kreminological analysis: leadership rankings from appearance at key public events or how they are listed in KCNA reports, analysis of Kim Jong-il’s on-the-spot-guidance visits, including both where he goes and who accompanies him, and so on. Among the analysts who have used this data to good effect is Kenneth Gause, who has a couple of classic pieces cited as further reading below.
The new guru of this activity at the moment is Luke Herman who--truth in advertising—is also a student at the Graduate School of International Relations and Pacific Studies where I teach. His massive report on the current state of play in the leadership covers the first half of the year, but also contains some information going back to the beginning of 2010. The headline findings (credit also due to the NK New site):
- As anticipated, Kim Jong-eun has moved up the rankings during the period, from 4th to 2nd. The rankings exclude KJI himself. Kim Young-nam—the head of state in his role as President of the Presidium of the Supreme People’s Assembly--remains number one behind Dear Leader. However, this standing is arguably artificial, since Kim Young-nam’s presence around Kim Jong Il is in fact a constant reminder of the subordination of the state to the leader and party.
- There are unconfirmed reports that Kim Jong-un has been named a vice-chairman of the National Defense Commission, which would put him in a position to use that vehicle to run the country. The powers of the NDC have been significantly strengthened by recent constitutional revisions. However, attention has also focused on the Party’s Central Military Commission (CMC) because of the fact that Kim Jong-un (as well as Ri Yong-ho) serves as vice-chairman; the CMC could be Kim’s vehicle, and there are also unconfirmed reports that he has gained control over some military appointments.
- Successions are typically characterized by purges. The function of such purges is two-fold: to remove potential sources of opposition and to build a new and independent base of support for the incoming leader. Herman’s report traces some of these ups and downs, including in the security apparatus. The most significant development in this regard is the removal of Ju Sang- song as Minister of People’s Security, replaced by Ri Myong-su who rocketed up the rankings as a result.
- But Herman also notes that if we consider public appearances with Kim Jong Il, “Kim Kyong-hui (Kim Jong-il’s sister, Politburo member and KPA General) and Jang Song-thaek (head of Administration Department, vice-chairman of National Defense Commission and alternate member of the Politburo) remain the “power couple” in North Korea. Both have accompanied Kim Jong-il over 70% of the time he has made a public appearance in the past year and a half, higher than Kim Ki-nam.
We should emphasize that the substantive significance of these developments is far from clear. We have little indication of factions that might signal a new policy direction. The most that we can attribute to the findings is that the succession seems to be moving forward. But even that process requires interpretation. For example, the continued presence of Kim Kyoung-hui and Jang Song-thaek around the throne could reflect mere tutelage, a “collective familial” form of rule, or the fact that they are positioned to wield significant decision-making power following the transition.
In a forthcoming post, we parse some of the institutional fine-points from the report
Further reading:
Kenneth Gause, "The North Korean Leadership: System Dynamics and Fault Lines." In Ralph Hassig and Kongdan Oh, eds. North Korean Policy Elites. Alexandria, Virginia: Institute for Defense Analyses, 2004 and Gause, North Korean Civil-Military Trends: Military-First Politics to a Point. Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, September 2006.
