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Whenever I am asked for suggestions for an introduction to the Korean peninsula, I always start with Don Oberdorfer’s The Two Koreas. Oberdorfer was a diplomatic correspondent for the Washington Post who spent the early 1970s in Tokyo and subsequently rose through the ranks to cover US foreign policy more generally. His 1971 book Tet! demonstrated clearly how the Vietcong’s tactical defeat in the Tet offensive was turned into a strategic victory; the offensive was the beginning of the end of the US presence in Vietnam. The Two Koreas was written after he had retired from the Post and was teaching at SAIS. Originally published in 1997, and updated once in 2001, a new addition (linked above) was published last year with Robert Carlin that carries the story forward with the expected care and attention to detail.
What struck me about Oberdorfer’s journalism—or more accurately, current history—was the combination of a large picture with attention not only to historical detail but the unique perspectives of the participants. Among the many great chapters in the book, I still assign—and cite—the chapters dealing with the great strategic shock North Korea faced in the early 1990s. As the Soviet Union, Russia and China began to rethink their approach to the peninsula, the North Korean leadership did little more than fume and rant; Oberdorfer’s coverage of the September 1990 Shevardnadze visit to Pyongyang is worth the price of the whole book. Gorbachev had decided to move his country’s foreign policy in a more pragmatic direction, which naturally sent Soviet-North Korean relations into a tailspin. Trying to provide assurances and calm the waters, Gorbachev dispatched Shevardnadze to Pyongyang. Kim Il Sung refused to meet him. Rather Kim Young Nam delivered a rant, including a threat to pursue the nuclear option. Fed up Shevardnadze packed his bags and left. Recently released documents collated by Sergey Radchenko at the Cold War History Project add detail, but basically confirm the Oberdorfer account. Oberdorfer documents how ill-equipped the North Korean leadership was to adapt to new circumstances; as we argued in Famine in North Korea—and Oberdorfer also noted—these choices set the stage for the economic collapse and famine of the mid-1990s.
Jae Ku, director of SAIS’ US-Korea Institute provides a fitting testament:
“Don’s understanding of Korea was unparalleled. He not only understood but had internalized Korea’s geostrategic predicament and the Korean people’s sentiments. His deep knowledge of Korea came from his own eyewitness accounts of modern Korean development. Simply put, Don was Korea’s best friend.” The Washington Post obit outlines his career with the paper. Bob Carlin has an excellent tribute at 38North. RIP.
