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China's leading economic journal, Caixin, recently asked us to comment on KJI's recent visit to the Middle Kingdom. We took it as an opportunity to try to convince a Chinese readership that North Korean behavior is not exactly in the country's strategic interest. As we always say, don't hold your breath. Chinese version is here; English follows.
China-DPRK Relations: The Cost of “Lips and Teeth”
Stephan Haggard
The United States watched Kim Jong Il’s visit to China—his third in less than two years--with great interest. Beijing has consistently expressed its interest in full denuclearization of the Korean peninsula and has assisted that process by leading the Six Party Talks. Washington has long hoped that China would be able to bring persuasion, inducements and even pressure to bear on North Korea to take a more forthcoming position in order to resume the talks.
Unfortunately, those hopes were not realized. The trip exhibited a number of patterns we have seen on previous visits. First, Chinese officials and the Chinese press say things that are subtly different than official DPRK accounts. Second, Chinese statements reflect aspirations—particularly with respect to economic reform—that do not reflect what the North Korean leadership is interested or capable of doing. Third and most importantly, the trip did not yield anything concrete with respect to moving the peace process forward. To the contrary, no sooner had Kim Jong Il returned home than the National Defense Commission unleashed a vitriolic attack on the Lee Myung Bak administration, a not-so-subtle slap at Chinese diplomacy.
Statements with respect to the Six Party Talks reflect these problems clearly. Xinhua reported that Kim Jong Il had said that “the DPRK hopes to ease tensions on the Korean Peninsula, sticks to the objective of denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula and believes that the six-party talks should be resumed at an early date.”
Kim was also quoted as hoping that North-South relations could be improved.
Reading this, you might think that KJI had recognized the importance of making progress on the Six Party Talks in order to get economic reform going and that improving relations with Seoul would be necessary to do so.
But the Korea Central News Agency’s (KCNA’s) version of events, offered up on May 26, tells a very different story. The vast majority of an extraordinarily long story devoted to the trip—nearly 2500 words--emphasizes the strengthening of the Sino-DPRK political relationship and the importance of “cooperation,” which typically includes more investment, aid and political support from China. Strengthening the political relationship means, in part, accepting the hereditary succession plan from Kim Jong Il to Kim Jong Un, about which Chinese authorities have clearly had doubts.
The KCNA’s report makes only passing mention of the nuclear question, less than 50 words. The passage is worth quoting in full: “Recognizing that the adherence to the goal of denuclearization on the whole Korean Peninsula, peaceful settlement of the issue through dialogue including the resumption of the six-party talks and the elimination of obstructive elements conform to the overall interests of Northeast Asia, the two sides shared views on making good understanding and coordination.”
How can such a short statement contain so many problems for the US and China? Here are at least three poison pills we are being asked to swallow.
First, “denuclearization on the whole peninsula” means that North Korea is not the only problem. Given that there are no other nuclear weapons on the peninsula, Pyongyang is still holding to the idea that the US nuclear umbrella must be addressed in some way. If this means security assurances of some sort, they can be negotiated. If it means weakening the deterrent capability of the alliance, it is not clear how that could be accomplished even in theory; as long as the United States has nuclear weapons, Pyongyang could say that they are threatened.
Second, the KCNA account argues for a peaceful settlement through dialogue, but this only “includes” a resumption of the Six Party Talks. This means that other talks—ie., direct bilateral talks with the United States or peace regime talks—would also be required. Such talks could be held in the context of the Six Party Talks, but they could become a distraction if Pyongyang is unwilling to address the nuclear issue.
But the biggest problem concerns South Korea. The Chosun Ilbo, a leading South Korean conservative newspaper, cited leaked claims that Hu Jintao urged Kim to engage in dialogue with South Korea. However, the KCNA account makes no mention of South Korea at all. By “eliminating obstructive elements,” the KCNA is clearly making reference to the Lee Myung Bak adminstration, which has moved away from the engagement strategy and generous foreign aid of the Kim Dae Jung and Roh Moo Hyun years.
The LMB government does bear some responsibility in this drama. Seoul has objected to a resumption of dialogue and aid unless the Cheonan and shelling of Yeonpyeong are addressed and North Korea actually does something about its nuclear program. This is warranted, but at some point a face-saving gesture for North Korea will have to be found; so far, the South’s offers—including of a North-South summit—have been completely rebuffed.
To the contrary, on May 30 Pyongyang released a blistering statement that it would have absolutely nothing to do with the LMB government at all. It also promised to cut the inter-Korean military communication cable in the East Sea, close a liaison office on Mt. Geumgang in the North, and attack South Korean groups engaging in psychological warfare near the inter-Korean border.
Similar problems are visible with respect to economic issues. China has long tried to persuade the North Korean leadership of the importance of economic reform. Even the itinerary of the trip—which included a number of factory visits in the Northeast provinces—were designed to demonstrate the advantages of the Chinese path. Local officials on one leg of the trip even took the North Korean leader to a market. The messages were not subtle.
However, Kim Jong Il’s main interest was securing investment and aid from China, with little acknowledgement of the importance of economic reform and improving the legal environment for foreign businesses. In a survey I conducted with Marcus Noland of Chinese firms doing business in North Korea, we found nearly unanimous dissastisfaction with the country’s infrastructure and regulations, as well as corruption. And as is widely known, North Korea is once again experiencing severe food shortages and ongoing malnutrition.
Dealing with North Korea is never easy, and China knows that as well as anyone. Despite the historically close relationship, Pyongyang has created a number of problems for Beijing since the inauguration of the Obama administration, including the missile and nuclear tests of 2009, the sinking of the Cheonan and the shelling of Yeonpyeong Island. These actions only serve to cement US-Korea-Japan relations and have resulted in a number of joint military exercises in the West Sea, an area of obvious strategic significance to China.
The United States and China have a common interest in trying to move North Korea in a more reformist direction. But US influence in this regard is much less than China’s. Beijing cannot deliver a strong and unambiguous message in public, but we certainly hope that the private conversations during this visit were tough-minded and direct. It is not in China’s interest for the DPRK to continue down its current military, political and economic path; we all need a change of course in Pyongyang.
