


State Resurgence in China?


February 7th, 2017

Nicholas R. Lardy
Anthony M. Solomon Senior Fellow
Peterson Institute for International Economics


Growth of Industrial Profits, Feb 2012 – Nov 2016



Share of Industrial Profits, Feb 2006 – Nov 2016




Softening Private Investment Growth, Feb 2006 – Nov 2016







Share of Private Investment, 2006 – Sep 2016




Fixed Asset Investment in Manufacturing, 2006 – 2015




Growth of Industry/Construction and Tertiary Industry, Q1 2010 – Q3 2016




Fixed Asset Investment in Services, 2006 – 2015




State Profits and Investment, 2007 and 2014




Share of RMB Corporate Loans Outstanding, 1995, 2009, 2013, & 2014



Share of RMB Corporate Loans (Flow), 2010 – 2014




State Investment Financed by State Budget, 2006 – 2015





Industrial Value Added Growth, 2012 – 2015





Takeaways

- The resurgence of state profits in 2016 is entirely cyclical
- The resurgence of state relative to private investment since 2011 is potentially far more adverse for China's long-term growth and financial stability
- Slowing of private investment is due to a combination of restrictions on entry into the service sector and crowding out of private investment
- The appropriate policy response is to ease entry restrictions in services and to create a more competitive financial sector