



MAKING SENSE OF THE PRODUCTIVITY SLOWDOWN: *NEXT STEPS*

Dan Andrews

Senior Economist
Structural Policy Analysis Division
Economics Department, OECD

Making Sense of the Productivity Slowdown

Peterson Institute for International Economics

Washington D.C. | 16 November 2015



Why did productivity growth slow, even before the crisis?


- Taking a granular approach, is it because:
 1. Slowing growth at the global productivity frontier?
 2. Stalling diffusion: slowing productivity convergence to the global frontier?
 3. Rising resource misallocation?
- Debate has generally centred on #1 but we know little about global frontier firms.
 - More likely to be: larger, profitable, MNE, patent ([slide A1](#)) + they come from various countries ([slide A2](#)).
- OECD research also shows:
 - More scope for policy to influence #2 and #3, than #1
 - Misallocation (#3) hinders diffusion (#2)




Rising productivity gap between firms at global frontier and others

Average of labour productivity across each 2-digit sector (log, 2001=0)

Manufacturing Sector



Services Sector



Industry-level data from 1985 show bigger divergence from the early 2000s (slide A3)



Possible explanations for this divergence

- Three possible technological explanations:
 - Technological diffusion slowed down
 - “Winner takes all” dynamics
 - Replication and diffusion of the magic bundle has become more difficult
- Robustness – not driven by:
 - Productivity measure: LP, TFP ([slide A4](#))
 - Frontier definition: Top 50, 100, 5% ([slide A5](#))
 - One particular industry ([slide A6](#)) or survival bias ([slide A7](#))



Diffusion: some conjectures and future work

- Update and extent the analysis, including more analysis of the role of policy.
- If diffusion stalled, what explains the timing?
 - Technology-related factors
 - Policy weakness thwarting scope for diffusion
 - IPR regimes need updating?
 - Barriers to entry and limits to market size (EU services)?
 - Vested interests and lobbying blocking wider penetration of ICT and new business models in services
- Links between rising wage inequality and productivity dispersion.




Misallocation: some conjectures and future work

- Time series work on misallocation is significant since most research is cross-sectional.
- We are thinking about:
 - Misallocation in market services ([slide A8](#))
 - “Zombie” firms, K-misallocation, ↓ business dynamism
 - Policy-induced exit costs (high in southern Europe)
- Misallocation across cities: links with housing policies
- Misallocation of skills
 - Skill mismatch affects $\frac{1}{4}$ workers and is correlated with policies, esp. housing market distortions ([slide A9](#))
 - Human talent trapped in inefficient firms constrains growth of innovative firms and diffusion ([slide A10](#))



Productivity gains from reducing skill mismatch to the best practice level



Differences in skill mismatch can account for one-fifth of the labour productivity gap between Italy and the US.



The OECD new book: out now!

Available at:

<http://www.oecd.org/economy/the-future-of-productivity.htm>

Book + 5 page policy note +
technical papers + videos and ppt

Authors:

Müge Adalet McGowan

Dan Andrews

Chiara Criscuolo

Giuseppe Nicoletti

THE FUTURE OF PRODUCTIVITY





The following reports and papers detail the results:

- Adalet McGowan, M., D. Andrews, C. Criscuolo and G. Nicoletti (2015), [*The Future of Productivity*](#)
- Adalet McGowan, M. and D. Andrews (2015a), "[Labour Market Mismatch and Labour Productivity: Evidence from PIAAC Data](#)"
- Adalet McGowan, M. and D. Andrews (2015b), "[Skill Mismatch and Public Policy in OECD Countries](#)"
- Andrews, D. and F. Cingano (2012), "[Public policy and resource allocation: Evidence from firms in OECD countries](#)"
- Andrews, D., C. Criscuolo and P. Gal (2015), "[Frontier Firms, Technology Diffusion and Public Policy: Micro Evidence from OECD Countries](#)"
- Andrews, D., C. Criscuolo and C. Menon (2014), "[Do resources flow to patenting firms? Cross-country evidence from firm level data](#)"
- Calvino, F., C. Criscuolo and C. Menon (2015), "[Cross-country Evidence of Start-Up Dynamics](#)"
- Criscuolo, C., P. Gal and C. Menon (2014), "[The Dynamics of Employment Growth: New Evidence from 18 Countries](#)",
- Saia, A., D. Andrews and S. Albrizio (2015), "[Public Policy and Spillovers From the Global Productivity Frontier: Industry Level Evidence](#)",



Spares

A1-A3. Characteristics of the global frontier

A4-A7. Frontier robustness

A8-A12. More on misallocation, including skills



A1. The globally most productive firms: Who are they?

Comparing outcomes between frontier and non-frontier firms (2005)

Frontier: 100 globally most productive firms within each 2-digit sector

| | Global Frontier Firms | Non-Frontier Firms | Difference in means |
|---------------------------------|-----------------------|--------------------|---------------------|
| | Mean | Mean | |
| Productivity | 4.06 | 2.51 | 1.5 *** |
| Employment | 309 | 229 | 81 |
| Capital stock (€m) | 31 | 19 | 12 ** |
| Turnover (€m) | 250 | 59 | 191 *** |
| Profit rate | 0.57 | 0.13 | 0.45 *** |
| Age | 21.5 | 23.2 | -1.7 *** |
| MNE status* | | | |
| <i>Probability</i> | 0.47 | 0.28 | 0.19 *** |
| Patenting status | | | |
| <i>Depreciated patent stock</i> | 3.71 | 0.90 | 2.8 *** |

Note: definition based on Solow-residual type MFP, using industry-specific but country- and time-invariant factor shares. N = 297,688



A2. The globally most productive firms: Coming from various countries


| | Manufacturing | | | Business services | Total market sector |
|---------------------------------|---------------|---------------|-----------|-------------------|---------------------|
| | Total | ICT producing | ICT using | | |
| Austria | | x | x | x | |
| Belgium | x | x | x | x | x |
| Czech Republic | | | | | |
| Germany | x | x | x | x | x |
| Denmark | x | x | x | | |
| Estonia | | | | | |
| Spain | x | x | x | x | x |
| Finland | | x | x | | |
| France | x | x | x | x | x |
| Great Britain | x | x | x | x | x |
| Greece | | | | x | |
| Hungary | | | | | |
| Italy | x | x | x | x | x |
| Japan | x | x | x | x | x |
| Korea | x | x | x | x | x |
| Netherlands | x | x | x | x | x |
| Norway | | | | | |
| Poland | | | | x | |
| Portugal | | | | | |
| Sweden | x | x | x | x | x |
| Slovenia | | | | | |
| Slovakia | | | | | |
| United States | x | x | x | x | x |
| Number of countries (Total: 23) | 12 | 14 | 14 | 14 | 11 |

Source: Andrews, D. C. Criscuolo and P. Gal (2015), "[Frontier firms, technology diffusion and public policy: micro evidence from OECD countries](#)", OECD Productivity Working Paper No. 2.



A3. Industry-level data show bigger divergence from early 2000s

Unweighted average of TFP in the non-farm business sector; index 1985=0



Source: OECD calculations based on Bourles et al (2013) dataset.




A4. Robustness: Productivity measure

Log of Solow-residual based MFP, top 100; index 2001=0


Manufacturing

— Frontier — Laggard



Services

— Frontier — Laggard






A5. Robustness: Frontier measure

Log of labor productivity, top 5%, top 10%; index 2001=0


Manufacturing

--- Frontier (top 10%) — Frontier (top 5%) — Laggard



Services

--- Frontier (top 10%) — Frontier (top 5%) — Laggard







A6. Robustness: By Industry and ICT intensity

Log of labor productivity; index 2001=0


ICT_Using_Manufacturing




ICT_Producing_Manufacturing




Non_ICT_Manufacturing




ICT Using Services



ICT Producing Services



Non ICT Services




2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009




A7. Robustness: Surviving firms only

Log of labor productivity, top 100; index 2001=0
Balanced sample, both on and off the frontier

Manufacturing




Services





A8. Misallocation, big time!

Contribution of the allocation of employment across firms to the level of labour productivity; per cent






A9. Skill misallocation is policy-induced

The probability of skill mismatch and public policies


◆ Effect at policy median





A10. Diffusion comes easier to some economies than others

Estimated frontier spillover (% pa) associated with a 2% point increase in MFP growth at the global productivity frontier





A11. Skill mismatch: combining self-assessment with skill proficiency


Use micro-data from OECD Survey of Adult Skills (PIAAC) to:

1. Create a quantitative scale of the skills required to perform the job for each occupation using the literacy scores of well-matched workers – *those who neither feel they have the skills to perform a more demanding job nor require further training to perform their current job satisfactorily.*
2. Use this scale to identify *min* and *max* threshold values (e.g., based on the 10th and 90th percentile), which bounds what it is to be a well-matched worker.
3. Workers with scores lower (higher) than this *min* (*max*) threshold in their occupation are under (over) skilled.



A12. Over-skilling is more prevalent than under-skilling

Percentage of workers with skill mismatch



On average, over-skilling is ~2½ times more likely than under-skilling