



Floating exchange rates and emerging markets

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Some big questions about flexible rates

- Monetary independence?
- Insulation properties
- Original sin and balance sheet effects
- How dirty a float?
- The global safety net

Monetary independence?

- Given Mundell's impossible trinity (the trilemma), if you give up exchange rate stability, you gain monetary independence
- Today we know that is not quite the case
- You do not have to be French to worry about the dollar cycle (Rey, 2013; Bruno and Shin, 2015; Shin, 2020; Miranda-Agrippino and Rey, 2022)
- It all goes back to Calvo, Leiderman, and Reinhart (1996): external factors determine capital flows
- In fact, a strong dollar predicts pretty much everything for EMs
 - Capital flows, credit conditions, output, consumption, investment...
- Yes, some EM countries loosen when the US tightens
 - But they are few
 - And they do so at their own peril

And yet....

- Despite the dollar cycle, floating provides substantial insulation
- In response to a 10 percent dollar appreciation
 - “GDP, investment and the stock market fall more sharply for pegs”
 - Obstfeld and Zhou (2023)
- This is because a peg requires larger tightening in response
- Or, because shock raises required excess return on EM bonds
 - Under flex, this is achieved via depreciation; under fix, via rate spike
 - Kalemli-Özcan (2019)
- Or, because the old expenditure-switching story still matters

What happened to balance sheet effects?



- With original sin (dollar debt), a sharp depreciation..
 - Could wreck balance sheets and trigger a crisis
 - Could even be contractionary
- But this does not seem to have happened!
- Flexible rates seem to provide more insulation
 - Even under original sin and balance sheet problems (relative magnitudes)
 - Céspedes, Chang and Velasco (2004)
- Or, because balance sheet composition is endogenous
 - Under credible flex, less debt, more domestic currency debt, more hedging
 - Chang and Velasco (2006)
- Note: original sin has not disappeared (80 percent of debt in dollars)
- Could even have “original sin redux” (Carstens and Shin, 2019)

Why the dirty floats?

- Under inflation targeting..
 - Interest rate is supposed to be targeted at inflation and the output gap
 - And the exchange rate is supposed to float freely
- But on planet earth...
 - Almost all inflation targeters intervene
 - And EM inflation targeters hold huge reserves
- The Catholic approach to exchange rates?
 - Promise to do one thing
 - But quietly do something else
- Interventions “when exchange rate is strongly misaligned” only
- Why? Is it indeterminacy? Bubbles? Hyper-depreciation paths?
 - Obstfeld and Rogoff (1983) but for exchange rates?

The global financial safety net

- EMs need access to emergency dollar liquidity
 - During “risk off” episodes of the dollar cycle
 - Because of the occasional need to intervene in the exchange market
 - To provide dollar support to banks
- But on planet earth...
 - Such access is limited to a few...
 - That qualify for swap arrangements with the Fed
 - That qualify for IMF liquidity mechanisms
- The global financial safety net
 - Is geographically fragmented
 - Is full of holes
 - Can we do better? Yes, we can!

In conclusion....



For emerging markets, a system of flexible exchange rates (with occasional interventions) is “the worst policy – except for all the others that have been tried”



Thank you