Congressional Testimony

The Euro Area Crisis: Origin, Current Status, and European and US Responses

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Subcommittee Chairman Burton, ranking member Meeks, members of the Subcommittee on Europe and Eurasia, it is a pleasure to testify before you today on the origin, and current status of European and US responses to the euro area crisis. In my written testimony, I will address three issues; the origins of the four principal aspects of the euro area crisis, the recent crises responses by European and US leaders, and the impact of the euro area crisis on US political and economic interests.

The Origin of the Euro Area’s Four Different Crises, their Overlaps, and Mutual Reinforcement

The euro area crisis has gradually since May 2010 taken center place in an increasingly volatile global economy. It has become evident that the crisis consists of four distinct, though frequently overlapping and mutually reinforcing crises; (1) A design crisis, as the euro area from its creation in the 1990s has lacked crucial institutions to ensure financial stability during a crisis; (2) A fiscal crisis centered in Greece, but present across the southern euro area and Ireland; (3) A competitiveness crisis manifest in large and persistent pre-crisis current account deficits in the euro area periphery and even larger intra-euro-area current account imbalances; and (4) A banking crisis first visible in Ireland, but spreading throughout the euro area via accelerating concerns over sovereign solvencies.

Before proceeding to discuss each crisis in more detail, it is immediately important to note how each of the four simultaneous crises currently raging in the euro area would pose a significant challenge for policymakers in any individual country, and that none of the four can credibly be solved in isolation. The current euro area economic and political situation is characterized by an unusual degree of complexity, frustrating attempts at a single expeditious comprehensive solution. No silver bullet answer to the euro area’s current travails is available to EU policymakers, and the drawn-out inconclusive crisis containment efforts witnessed in Europe since early 2010 is set to continue for a while yet.

The Euro Area Design Challenge

The concrete thinking about an economic and monetary union (EMU) in Europe goes back to 1970, when the Werner Report¹ laid out a detailed three stage plan for the establishment of EMU in Europe by 1980. Members of the European Community would gradually increase coordination of economic and fiscal policies, while reducing exchange rate fluctuations and finally fixing these irrevocably. The collapse of the Bretton Woods system and the first oil crisis in the early 1970s caused the Werner Report proposals to be abandoned.

By the mid-1980s, following the 1979 creation of the European Monetary System and the initiation of Europe’s internal market, European policymakers again took up the idea of an EMU. The Delors Report² from 1989 envisioned the achievement of EMU by 1999, moving gradually (again in three stages) towards closer economic coordination among the EU members, with binding constraints on member states’ national budgets, and a single currency with an independent European Central Bank (ECB).

1 Available at http://aei.pitt.edu/1002/1/monetary_werner_final.pdf.
While Europe’s currency union therefore has lengthy historical roots, it was an unforeseen shock—German reunification in October 1990—that provided the political impetus for the creation of the Maastricht Treaty, which in 1992 provided the legal foundation and detailed design for today’s euro area. With the historical parity in Europe between (West) Germany and France no longer a political and economic reality, French president Francois Mitterrand and German Chancellor Helmut Kohl launched the EMU process as a principally political project to irrevocably join the French, German, and other European economies together in an economic and monetary union, and cement European unity.

This political imperative for launching the euro by 1999, however, frequently facilitated that politically necessary compromises, rather than theoretically sound and rigorous rules and regulations, made up the institutional framework for the euro.

While the earlier Werner and Delors reports discussing the design of EMU had been explicit about the requirement to compliment a European monetary union (e.g., the common currency) with a European economic union complete with binding constraints on member states’ behavior, political realities in Europe made this goal unattainable within the timeframe dictated by political leaders following German reunification.

The continued principal self-identification among Europeans as first and foremost residents of their home country, i.e., Belgians, Germans, Poles, Italians, etc., made the collection of direct taxes to fund a large centralized European budget implausible. The frequently discussed relatively high willingness of Europeans to pay taxes does not “extend to Brussels.” The designers of the euro area were consequently compelled to create the common currency area without a sizable central fiscal authority with the ability to counter regional specific (asymmetric) economic shocks or re-instill confidence in private market participants in the midst of a crisis—like the one the euro area is currently experiencing.

Similarly, the divergence in the economic starting points among the politically prerequisite “founding members” of the euro area moreover made the imposition of firm, objective fiscal criteria for membership in the euro area politically impossible. The Maastricht Treaty in principle included at least two hard “convergence criteria” for euro area membership—the so-called “reference values” of 3 percent general government annual deficit limit and 60 percent general government gross debt limit.

However, in reality these threshold values were anything but fixed, as the Maastricht Treaty Article 104c stated that countries could exceed the 3 percent deficit target, if “the ratio has declined substantially and continuously and reached a level that comes close to the reference value,” or “excess over the reference value is only exceptional and temporary and the ratio remains close to the reference value.” Euro area countries could similarly exceed the 60 percent gross debt target, provided that “the ratio is sufficiently diminishing and approaching the reference value at a satisfactory pace.”

5 The actual numerical reference values to Article 104c of the Maastricht Treaty are under “Protocol on the Excessive Deficit Procedure,” available at http://www.eurotreaties.com/maastrichtprotocols.pdf, page 28. The Maastricht Convergence Criteria for euro area membership eligibility include three additional metrics: inflation (within 1.5 percent of the three EU countries with the lowest inflation rate), long-term interest rates (within 2 percent of the three lowest interest rates in the European Union), and exchange rate fluctuations (participation for two years in the ERM II narrow band of exchange rate fluctuations).
In other words, it was a wholly political decision whether a country could become a member of the euro area or not, and had relatively less to do with the fundamental economic strengths and weaknesses of the country in question. As it was politically inconceivable to launch the euro without Italy, the third largest economy in continental Europe, or Belgium, home of the European capital Brussels, both countries became members despite in 1997-98 having gross debt levels of almost twice the reference value of 60 percent (figure 1).

As a result, Europe’s monetary union was launched in 1999 comprising of a set of countries that were far more diverse in their economic fundamentals and far less economically integrated than had been envisioned in the earlier Werner and Delors reports. Yet, not only did European political leaders proceed with the launch of the euro with far more dissimilar countries than what economic theory would have predicted feasible, shortly after the launch of the euro, they went further and undermined the remaining credibility of the rules-based framework for the coordination of national fiscal policies in the euro area.

Building on the euro area convergence criteria, the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) was intended to safeguard sound public finances, prevent individual euro area members from running unsustainable fiscal policies, and thus guard against moral hazard by enforcing budget discipline. However, faced with breaching the 3 percent deficit limit in 2002-04, France and Germany pushed through a watering down of the SGP rules in March 2005 so that, as in the Maastricht Treaty itself, introduced sufficient flexibility into the interpretation of SGP that its enforcement became wholly political, and had only limited reference to objective economic facts. Individual euro members subsequently failed to restore the long-term sustainability of their finances during the growth years before the global financial crisis began.

By 2005 the euro area was as a result of numerous shortcuts taken to achieve and sustain a political goal: a common currency area consisting of a very dissimilar set of countries, without a central fiscal agent, without any credible enforcement of budget discipline or real deepening economic convergence.

Initially, however, none of these danger signs mattered, as the financing costs in private financial markets of all euro area members quickly fell towards the traditionally low interest rates of Germany (figure 2).

It is beyond this testimony to speculate about the causes of this lasting colossal mispricing of credit risk in the euro area sovereign debt markets by private investors in the first years after the introduction of the euro. The financial effects of this failure on the other hand were obvious, as euro area governments and private investors were able to finance themselves at historically low (often significantly negative real) interest rates seemingly irrespective of their economic fundamentals. Large public and private debt overhangs were correspondingly built up in the euro area, during the first years of the euro area and in the run up to the global financial crisis in 2008. Financial markets’ failure to properly assess the riskiness of different euro area countries papered over these issues until the global financial crisis finally struck.

The euro area institutional design has in essence been that of a “fair weather currency”, with no central institutions capable of compelling the member states to act in unison. As a new, untested, and severely under-institutionalized entity, the euro area has had no capacity to act forcefully during the current crisis or restore confidence among private businesses and consumers. Unless that changes, the euro area will be unable to exit the current crisis.

European policymakers therefore today are faced with the acute challenge of correcting the design flaws in the euro area institutions that their predecessors, in their quest to quickly realize a political vision for Europe, helped create. The euro area needs a new rule book. Leaders must, in the midst of this crisis, craft a new set of euro area

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institutions that for the first time provide the common currency with binding fiscal rules for its member states, and a centralized fiscal entity capable of acting in a crisis on behalf of the euro area as a whole. This will require the transfer of sovereignty from individual member states to the supra-national euro area level considerably beyond what has previously occurred in the European Union.

The Euro Area Fiscal Challenge
The euro area fiscal crisis is concentrated in Greece, which according to the latest estimates from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the European Commission (EC), and the European Central Bank (ECB) will have a general government debt surpassing 180 percent of GDP by 2012. Despite Greece’s IMF program and associated financial support from the European Union and IMF since May 2010, the country is at this point clearly not able to repay all its creditors in full and has to restructure its government debt. Greece will consequently be the first ever euro area country and first Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) member since shortly after World War II that has been forced to restructure its sovereign debt.

Portugal and Ireland are currently subject to IMF programs, too, but in contrast to Greece have successfully implemented their program commitments to this date.7 Through continued strong reform implementation and access to financial assistance from the European Union and IMF in the years ahead, it looks still potentially feasible for Portugal and Ireland to in the medium term restore their access to private financial markets at sustainable interest rates.

However, as illustrated in figure 3, the cost of financing for Spain and Italy has also risen substantially in recent months with secondary 10-year bond market yields currently between 5.5 and 6 percent. Unlike, however, the three smaller euro area countries with IMF programs, Spain and Italy are economies of a size that makes them “too big to bailout” for the euro area, even with IMF help. The fact that financial markets have begun to doubt the fiscal sustainability of “too big to bailout” members of the euro area is at the heart of the euro area policymakers’ fiscal challenge.

The key link between Greece, Spain, and Italy is the issue of “contagion,”8 i.e., a situation in which instability in specific asset markets or institutions is transmitted to one or more other specific such asset markets or institutions. Inside a currency union like the euro area, the central bank is legally barred from guaranteeing all the sovereign debts of individual member states,9 and for political reasons each sovereign members’ debts remains distinct.10 Yet the debt is denominated in the same currency and governed by at least some common institutions, so the phenomenon of contagion has particular force. If private investors begin to fear that a precedent will be set inside the euro area with the imposition of haircuts on Greek sovereign debt, they will assess the riskiness of other

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9 Article 123 in the EU Treaty states “overdraft facilities or any other type of credit facility with the European Central Bank or with the central banks of the Member States (hereinafter referred to as ‘national central banks’) in favour of Union institutions, bodies, offices or agencies, central governments, regional, local or other public authorities, other bodies governed by public law, or public undertakings of Member States shall be prohibited, as shall the purchase directly from them by the European Central Bank or national central banks of debt instruments.”
10 As discussed above, with the vast majority of European citizens still self-identifying as citizens of their respective countries (rather than the euro area), a pooling of all the national sovereign debts of the euro area into a single debt instrument—similar to what Alexander Hamilton achieved for the ‘United States’ war debts in 1790—is not a realistic political option in Europe at this point. Another critical political difference is that unlike the war debts incurred by the American colonies during the Revolutionary War, the outstanding debts of individual euro area members have not been incurred in order to achieve a “common cause.” The political narrative of seeing such debts “honored in common” by all euro area members consequently does not exist.
euro area members’ sovereign debt differently once the “risk free status” of euro area sovereign debt has been impaired. The large increases in the interest rates on Italian and Spanish government debt seen immediately following the July 21, 2011 EU Council decision to first introduce haircuts on Greek government debt looks, in the absence of simultaneous new bad economic news released from the two countries, to be largely due to contagion.

Given the high public and private debt levels built up before the global financial crisis in Spain and Italy, the sudden emergence of contagion, and associated repricing by private investors of the riskiness of these two countries, has the potential to initiate destabilizing self-fulfilling interest-rate-solvency spirals. Contagion from Greece causes Italian interest rates to go up, which, given Italy’s high existing debt levels, adds materially to the interest burden, necessitating further austerity measures, further reducing economic growth in the short-term, leading to lower government revenues and increased financial market concerns, again increasing both the Italian government deficit and interest burden. The presence of contagion inside a currency union, where many individual members have high debt levels consequently has the potential of turning what might previously have been stable and sustainable high debt burdens into unstable unsustainable debt burdens.

The unique degree of independence of the ECB adds a further complication to such contagion inside the euro area. Its independence derives from Article 282 of the EU Treaty,11 which states that the central bank “shall be independent in the exercise of its powers and in the management of its finances. Union institutions, bodies, offices and agencies, and the governments of the Member States shall respect that independence.” With Treaty-defined independence, the ECB is more akin to a Supreme Court than a central bank in the mold of the US Federal Reserve, whose independence is derived from the Federal Reserve Act passed by Congress (which Congress expressly reserves the right to amend, alter, or repeal).12 The ECB has no political masters and the EU Treaty moreover bars bar elected officials from criticizing its decisions.

In a sovereign and financial crisis, such total central bank independence might actually hinder the restoration of market confidence, because it might further undermine investors’ trust in the solvency of a government that does not ultimately control its own central bank, lacks its own currency, and thus has no ultimate lender of last resort. The European Treaty’s Article 123 forbids the ECB to extend credit to member states, preventing it from issuing any blanket guarantees for their sovereign debt. Due to the complete independence of the ECB, and the restrictions the EU Treaty places on it, the euro area thus lacks an important confidence boosting measure in the face of contagion.

On the other hand, the ECB’s independence and status as the only pan-euro-area institution capable of direct forceful action to calm global financial markets bestows upon the ECB’s governing council a degree of leverage over elected officials in this crisis not seen elsewhere in the world. This gives the ECB leadership the ability to engage in horse trading with democratically elected governments behind closed doors, where it can quietly demand that government leaders implement far-reaching reforms. A clear example of this came in August 2011 just ahead of the ECB’s initiation of emergency support purchases of Italian government debt. The sitting and incoming presidents of the ECB wrote bluntly to Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi, stating that “the [ECB] Governing Council considers that pressing action by the Italian authorities is essential to restore the confidence of investors”13 followed by a list of more than ten specific required reforms to be implemented by the Italian government.

The degree of independence and influence of the ECB matters for the attempts to find an expeditions solution to the euro area fiscal crisis, as it is actually not in the ECB’s interest to act too decisively to immediately try to end any contagion or the crisis more broadly. It is not that the ECB cannot step in. There is no asset it cannot buy, if the governing council agrees. The strategy of allowing financial market mayhem to pressure European governments is therefore less risky than it seems. Ultimately, the ECB has the means to calm markets down but its intention is to do so only to avoid absolute disaster.

A sweeping preemptive “helping hand to euro area governments” under speculative attack would from the perspective of the ECB be counterproductive, as it would relieve pressure on governments to reform. The ECB’s game is thus not to end the crisis at all costs as soon as possible but to act deliberately to cajole governments into implementing the crisis solutions it wants. The market volatility seen accelerating in recent months becomes something not to be avoided, but to use as a club against recalcitrant and reform-resistant euro area leaders.

European policymakers therefore today are faced with the acute challenge of enabling Greece to restructure its unsustainable sovereign debt, while at the same time ensuring that such an event has no precedent-setting effects inside the euro area and that contagion among sovereign debt markets consequently is contained. Ring-fencing Greece geographically and in the time dimension (i.e. assuring that Greece will only ever go through a single one-off sovereign debt restructuring) will require that further financial assistance in the coming years be provided to Greece itself, as well as Portugal and Ireland. The sizable majority of this support must sensible come from the rest of the euro area, with some continued financial participation also of the IMF.

In addition, to further restrict contagion, euro area leaders must devise a method that can provide a degree of preemptive financial support to “too big to bail out” euro area members and potentially lower their primary bond market cost of finance. This is the key aspect of the current debate surrounding how to utilize the €440 billion European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) most effectively. However, given the constraints on and reluctance of the ECB to participate directly in any such financial support (though for instance providing leverage to the EFSF) to large non-IMF program countries, the resources available to euro area leaders will be constrained. Any financial benefits to large beneficiary countries like Spain and Italy from new euro area measures will moreover be relatively limited, due to the large weight inside the euro area itself of the beneficiary countries themselves. Irrespective of the ultimate format chosen by euro area leaders, the “correlation between benefactors and beneficiaries” will be so large that the financial advantage will be relatively modest. There will be no euro area “bazooka” created from the EFSF.

Ultimately, the euro area will have to rely on its large members to “bail themselves out” through a lengthy period of fiscal consolidation. Financial markets are unlikely to be satisfied with this outcome, and while the ECB will continue to act as a conditional final defender of financial stability in the euro area, heightened levels of uncertainty and volatility will remain a feature of the euro area sovereign debt and other asset markets several years ahead.

The Euro Area Competitiveness Challenge

The euro area was wrought by merging together into a single currency a number of highly divergent European economies, and for reasons of political expediency, any binding political euro area rules and intrusive regulations that could have forced a real economic convergence to occur among divergent euro area members during the euro’s first decade were abandoned. Cushioned by the seemingly secure access to cheap financing once inside the euro area, most member states moreover scaled back the implementation of structural reforms of their national economies.¹⁴

The principal exception was Germany, which in the years immediately after the euro introduction implemented a series of far reaching reforms of especially its labor markets and pension system. Consequently, Europe’s

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traditionally strongest and most competitive economy during the first decade of the euro area gradually pulled itself even further ahead of most of the other members of the common currency. A persistent pattern inside the euro area consequently became the widening current account imbalances with Germany and other Northern members running surpluses and especially the Southern peripheral members running deficits (figure 4).

Financing their large external deficits posed few obstacles for peripheral countries prior to the global financial crisis, even as it became clearer that the inflows of foreign capital were increasingly channeled towards financing speculative real estate investments, rather than adding to new productive asset investments. With the disappearance of foreign private capital following the onslaught of the global financial crisis, peripheral euro area deficit countries and their banks suddenly found themselves instead overwhelmingly dependent on financial support from the ECB. However, while such central support will be continuous inside any functioning currency union, a longer-term requirement for peripheral euro area nations to regain competitiveness and restore external balance (or surplus) remains. Without improving external competitiveness and increasing exports/reducing imports, the euro area periphery will not be able to restore domestic economic growth during their current prolonged period of fiscal consolidation.

Inside a currency union and without the ability to devalue their currency against major trading partners, peripheral euro area members, however, do not have access to the traditionally fastest and most effective way through which a country can regain external competitiveness. Consequently, the only means the euro area peripheral countries have at their disposal is to increase the competitiveness that might be effective in a longer-term framework. Such measures include numerous traditional “supply-side structural reforms” of especially peripheral euro area labor markets, where the often legally sanctioned coercive power of labor unions, the rigidity of collective bargaining agreements, and automatic wage indexation to the public sector must be curtailed. Nominal wage levels at the firm level must be brought into line with productivity, an effort that in numerous instances will lead to nominal wage cuts.

European policymakers face a competitiveness challenge today in which the precise requirements of the euro area periphery to regain their external competitiveness and for the euro area as a whole to limit intra–euro area imbalances will vary depending on individual country circumstances and require additional measures in surplus countries (such as Germany), too. It is furthermore evident that available policy options inside a currency union are of a structural reform character. Such reforms can only hope to be effective in raising competitiveness and potential economic growth rates in the medium term, and will indeed in the short term, though for instance required nominal wage declines hurt economic growth.

The Euro Area Banking Crisis

The first manifestations of a banking crisis in the euro area in Ireland in 2008 had relatively few pan–euro area elements about it. The Irish real estate boom was clearly supported by the record low negative real interest rates in the country following the introduction of the euro (figure 5), but the 2008 collapse of the Irish banking sector and subsequently required rescue of the Irish government by the European Union and IMF was overwhelmingly

15 It can be seen in figure 4 how peripheral deficits have declined substantially since 2008. This, however, can be mostly related to the severe economic contractions experienced in the euro area periphery, which has temporarily caused import levels to collapse.

16 In this testimony I shall not discuss the option of members leaving the euro area. I will refrain from this for three main reasons; first of all, I consider the costs of any country leaving the euro area as catastrophically high for the country in question, irrespective of whether it is Greece or Germany. Secondly, it is clear from the political announcements of all EU leaders that the departure of any country from the euro area will not be tolerated (such a departure could prove to have a very serious contagion effect). And thirdly, as under the current EU Treaty, the departure from the euro area is legally undefined and thus presumed impossible.
due to domestic Irish domestic factors and failures.\textsuperscript{17} That on the other hand is not true of the most recent volatility to affect the euro area banking system.

Several systematic ailments that plague the euro area banking system are illustrated in table 1. First of all, the euro area’s banking system is very large relative to the size of the overall home economies, with the average euro area financial institution’s gross debt equal to 143 percent of GDP (the US average is equal to 94 percent). Secondly, euro area bank leverage is very high at tangible assets at 26 times common equity (the US level is 12 times). Thirdly, euro area banks tend to own a lot of the debt issued by their own governments (something US banks do to a much smaller degree).

The sheer size of the euro area banking system makes it—as illustrated in Ireland in 2008-10—problematic for already indebted euro area governments to credibly issue guarantees to stand behind their domestic banks in a crisis. This issue is aggravated by the low level of common equity (core tier 1) capital in euro area banks. With low private shareholder risk capital levels in euro area banks, euro area governments risk being frequently called upon to rescue domestic banks, as only a thin layer of private equity capital is available as first-loss risk capital. Disproportionally large capital injection requirements are another risk to euro area taxpayers in rescues of thinly capitalized banks. There is consequently a large degree of interdependence between the financial solidity of large domestic banking systems and national government solvency across the euro area.

The large bank ownership of government debt in the euro area presents a particularly intractable concern. Under the Basel Agreements, euro area (and other) banks are not required to set aside any risk capital to offset any future losses on government bond holdings. Sovereign bonds have by definition been deemed “risk free.” Consequently, when Greek government debt must be restructured, it will impose upon the euro area banks credit losses for which they have previously not set aside capital, and given the scale of ownership of such debt among domestic Greek banks, it will require that these be recapitalized with money from international donors. The same dynamic is inevitable across essentially all euro area members, as the domestic banking system will face ruinous capital losses if national sovereign debt is restructured, due to the high domestic government debt ownership.

Fearful that banks would require very large amounts of new equity capital, which would in many instances have to come from governments themselves and might therefore pose a challenge to some governments’ own solvency, European banking regulators have been reluctant to include any potential impairment of banks’ sovereign debt holdings in EU bank stress tests in 2010 and 2011. Given, however, the justified market concerns about the solvency of at least one euro area sovereign (Greece) and the potential for contagion to other euro area sovereign bond markets, stress tests that do not include the potential for losses on sovereign bonds cannot provide a credible measure of the riskiness of any euro area banking system. As long as solvency concerns exist about euro area governments, a high degree of volatility will surround the euro area banking system, which again provides a powerful feedback loop to increased investor fears about the financial stability of governments in the first place.

Lastly, in addition to low capital levels and associated concerns, many euro area banks also suffer from substantial liquidity risks with high degrees of dependence on short-term wholesale funding from markets where access may prove ephemeral and be subject to rapid changes.

Euro area governments face the challenge of having to rapidly stabilize their oversized and in the aggregate undercapitalized banking systems without having to dispense large amounts of capital themselves, as this could further jeopardize their own solvency. Further postponement today of forceful measures to stabilize the euro area banking system with new outside capital risks throwing the euro area into an accelerating credit crunch as banks deleverage and conserve their scarce capital. This would rapidly have a strongly detrimental effect on the broader growth prospects of the euro area.

\textsuperscript{17} See the Nyberg Report at \url{http://www.bankinginquiry.gov.ie/Documents/Misjuding%20Risk%20Causes%20of%20the%20Systemic%20Banking%20Crisis%20in%20Ireland.pdf}.
Not all euro area governments are in the same situation though, as for instance the German government would quite easily be able to manage an even very large government-led recapitalization of its national banking system. However, due to the close linkages among sovereigns (and consequently their banking systems) inside the euro area and the observable presence of contagion between them, a key challenge for European policymakers will be to move expeditiously to a new system of tougher pan-European banking support, regulation, and supervision. The establishment of a new set of common regulatory institutions for the European banking system will, however, due to the obvious implications that potential government financial-crisis support for banks have for governments’ own solvency, require a new level of fiscal integration in the euro area and the commensurate loss of national fiscal sovereignty.

The fact that the City of London, the financial center of the EU and the euro area, is located in the United Kingdom, which can safely be assumed to remain outside the euro area itself for the foreseeable future, further complicates this type of banking sector integration initiative.

**US and European Responses to the Euro Area Crisis**

US policymakers have faced substantial obstacles in their dealing with the euro area crisis. First of all, the US domestic economic crisis itself has demanded the keen attention of many relevant authorities. Most importantly, though, the possible direct actions by US policymakers have been limited by the fact that the euro area crisis is, despite its increasing global spillover potential, still at heart a domestic economic crisis inside another sovereign jurisdiction. For straightforward reasons of accountability, the euro area crisis should be dealt with overwhelmingly by European policymakers, using European financial resources and being guided by European political norms, traditions, and institutions. The ability of the US government to directly and bilaterally affect the outcome of the euro area crisis is consequently and appropriately limited.

At the same time, since the beginning of the euro area crisis in early 2010, US government representatives have, in my opinion, exercised important indirect pressure through multilateral channels and especially the IMF to expedite the European crisis resolution process and push it in generally beneficial directions. This is especially the case with respect to impressing upon European policymakers the importance of the stability of the banking system and the importance of restoring growth to the crisis-stricken euro area periphery.

In recent months, US government authorities have, in addition, provided European policymakers with direct and constructive first-hand advice concerning emergency crisis measures that were successfully utilized earlier during the crisis here in the United States. This concerns particularly US experiences using central bank leverage to maximize the financial impact of a finite pool of taxpayer money to fight different aspects of a widespread financial crisis.\(^{18}\)

Lastly, the constant, seamless, and expeditious collaboration with respect to, for instance, foreign exchange swaps between the Federal Reserve and ECB (and other central banks) should be mentioned as an essential example of direct US government engagement to address the economic fallout from the euro area crisis.

In general, the efforts of the US government to address the euro area crisis have been constructive and beneficial within the relatively limited scope they can credibly attain.

Turning to European responses to the euro area crisis, there is no doubt that had EU leaders acted much more forceful earlier in the crisis, much volatility and lost economic output could have been avoided. However,

paraphrasing former defense secretary Donald Rumsfeld, you fight an economic crisis with the institutions you have, not the institutions you might want. Certainly, the euro area went into its current financial and sovereign debt crisis woefully under-institutionalized, making what has been financially required to contain the crisis politically illegitimate in real time. Just as it took a huge tumble in the US stock market after the first failed vote to get the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) program passed by Congress in October 2008, European leaders have not been politically able to act proactively before circumstances left no other choice. The result has been a crisis resolution strategy characterized by an incremental reactionism to developments in financial markets and an inability to get ahead of them.

However, recall, as this testimony has made clear, the extraordinary degree of complexity that characterizes the task in front of EU leaders today. Not one, but multiple and simultaneous crises currently torment the euro area economies, none of which can be solved quickly or independently. Moreover, the sheer political boldness of the unique euro area experiment should be kept in mind, too. The degree of pooling of sovereignty and fiscal integration among sovereign entities already implemented during this crisis by EU leaders has historically only been accomplished by territories, countries, and governments in the immediate aftermath of wars of independence, decolonization, or political revolutions. That it can take place today in Europe in the midst of what is after all “only” a very deep economic crisis is testament to the extraordinary political will among Europe’s democratically elected leaders to sustain their currency union. Combined with the revealed aversion of Europe’s populations to turn to populist electoral alternatives, even during times of acute economic crisis, this will suggests that as long as Europe can avert imminent economic disaster—which its powerful central bank and squabbling leaders will manage—a steady and sustainable progress out of the crisis can be maintained.

Contrary to many descriptions of the euro area crisis response, it has not been a wasted crisis. Important decisions about strengthening Europe’s fiscal rules have been taken19, which implies an unprecedented transfer of fiscal sovereignty from national parliaments to the euro area level. Ultimately, strengthened fiscal and economic convergence rules in the euro area—which may in the longer term require a change in the EU Treaty to accomplish—is the tool with which the euro area will ensure that its “too-big-to-bail-out” countries of Italy and Spain will implement the required economic reforms to ensure solvency.

With the €440 billion EFSF, the euro area, now has for the first time a centralized fiscal vehicle that can provide resources to individual countries hit by asymmetric shocks. As the EFSF gives way to the permanent European Stability Mechanism (ESM) in 2012 or 2013, this new central fiscal agent will become a permanent new institutional feature of the euro area. In recent weeks, European leaders have similarly finally begun to more forcefully address the chronic undercapitalization problem in the euro area banking system. The euro area banking system cannot however become genuinely stable until the governments that back it are.

A more credibly-sized restructuring of the outstanding privately held Greek debt is now being negotiated. While this alone will far from restore Greek debt sustainability, an around 50 percent net present value (NPV) reduction will provide the political credibility in euro area donor countries of this being the “one and only Greek debt restructuring” ever. Following such a restructuring, providing concessional financing for Greece going forward to ensure its fiscal sustainability will wholly be a matter for the official sector and the euro area in particular. This should help limit the potential for additional contagion spreading to other countries from a Greek restructuring. The euro area provision of subsidized financing to Ireland and Portugal until these have regained market access, combined with the two countries’ strong IMF program implementation, will further restrict contagion in the longer term and help restore the credibility of euro area sovereign debt as “risk free.”

None of the euro area’s responses so far havenor in the future will serve as a silver bullet solution to the euro area crisis. The euro area crisis is simply too widespread and too complex for such answers to be crafted. The euro area

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crisis will therefore continue to add to global economic uncertainty and financial market volatility in the months if not years ahead.

The Impact of the Euro Area Crisis on US National Interests

It is in America’s vital national interest that Europe and the euro area—comprising the United States’ strongest historical strategic allies and with whom Americans, especially in an era of growing multipolarity in the world, share the relatively broadest norms and values—fix their economic crisis. With Europe as the largest destination of US exports and foreign direct investment and extensive cross ownership of large financial institutions, it is first of all inescapable that the US domestic economy will experience a further negative external shock from an unexpected further rapid deterioration of the euro area economic crisis. Should such deterioration occur, it is certain that the European Union as a whole will be forced to look even more exclusively inward and correspondingly lose even more of its willingness and declining capacity to assist the United States in the defense of its global political and economic interests.

However, despite these euro area crisis aspects of “our currency, but your problem too,” keeping in mind the US federal fiscal outlook, it is not commensurate with an appropriate and responsible defense of America’s national interest to bilaterally provide any financial assistance to the euro area. This is a task predominantly for Europe itself, as well as the appropriate multilateral organizations, noticeably the IMF.

On the issue of the IMF, the euro area crisis has on the other hand made it clear that it is in America’s national interest to help boost the prominence of the IMF as the key global financial crisis manager. As a declining relative share of the global economy, the United States must realize that its overarching strategic national interest lies in sustaining the global legitimacy of the IMF in particular and other existing global economic governance institutions, thereby shielding it from potential threats from new institutional designs originating outside the traditional G-7 countries. Sustaining the legitimacy of such existing global institutions, in whose establishment, design, leadership, and current modus operandi the United States historically played a far larger role than its current and especially future global economic weight dictates, is far more important for the United States’ continuing impact on global economic governance and the global economic system than any other global economic issue currently debated here in Washington.

It is consequently in the national interest of the United States to continue to push governance reforms at the IMF and participate fully in all internationally agreed capital commitments to the IMF to provide the organization with the biggest possible toolkit with which to combat global economic crises in general and the euro area crisis right now in particular. To the extent that additional IMF resources might in the future be committed to the euro area as part of standard IMF programs, the United States should support this.

In making this commitment, it should be recalled that the IMF as the super-preferred creditor has never lost any money lent to crisis-stricken countries, even if these ultimately had to restructure parts of their government debt. Properly utilized in the euro area through the IMF, US taxpayer funds are safe. It is in America’s national interest that they—if required—can be deployed.
Figure 1: General Government Gross Debt 1998, 11 Original Euro Area Members, Percent of GDP

Source: Eurostat
Figure 2: 10y Bond Rates Among Euro Area Members Jan 1992-Dec 2005

- Germany
- France
- Netherlands
- Finland
- Austria
- Belgium
- Spain
- Italy
- Portugal
- Ireland
- Greece

1999: The euro is launched
Greece joins the euro January 2011
Stability and Growth Pact watered down March 2005

Source: Eurostat
Figure 3: 10y Bond Rates Among Euro Area Members Jan 2007-Oct 2011

Source: Eurostat
Figure 4: Current Account Balances 1999-2011p, Select Euro Area Members, Percent of GDP

Source: IMF WEO September 2011
Figure 5: Long-term Real Interest Rates Jan 1990-Oct 2008

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<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Financial Institutions' Gross Debt (% of GDP)</th>
<th>Bank Leverage (Ratio of tangible assets/common equity in domestic banks)</th>
<th>Bank Claims on the Public Sector (Percent of GDP)</th>
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*Source: IMF GFSR September 2011, table 1.1*