# Appendix A
# Tables

## Table A.1 Exposure of official sector, annual data
(billions of dollars, percent of GDP in parentheses)

| | Start | Change in IMF exposure Yr 1 | Yr 2 | Yr 3 | Yr 4 | Yr 5 | Change in MDB exposure Yr 1 | Yr 2 | Yr 3 | Yr 4 | Yr 5 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Mexico | 1994 | 12.0 | 9.4 | 5.2 | 4.5 | 0.6 | 1.6 | 0.7 | –0.6 | 0.0 | –0.4 |
| | | (2.9) | (2.3) | (1.3) | (1.1) | (0.2) | (0.4) | (0.2) | (–0.2) | (0.0) | (–0.1) |
| Mexico[a] | 1993 | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| | | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Thailand | 1996 | 2.4 | 3.2 | 3.4 | 3.1 | 1.7 | 0.6 | 1.6 | 2.4 | 2.4 | 2.5 |
| | | (1.3) | (1.8) | (1.9) | (1.7) | (0.9) | (0.3) | (0.9) | (1.3) | (1.3) | (1.4) |
| Indonesia | 1996 | 3.0 | 9.1 | 10.2 | 10.8 | 9.1 | –1.4 | 0.6 | 2.5 | 2.7 | 2.1 |
| | | (1.3) | (4.0) | (4.5) | (4.8) | (4.0) | (–0.6) | (0.3) | (1.1) | (1.2) | (0.9) |
| Korea | 1996 | 11.1 | 16.9 | 6.1 | 5.8 | 0.0 | 4.6 | 9.2 | 10.1 | 9.7 | 9.5 |
| | | (2.1) | (3.2) | (1.2) | (1.1) | (0.0) | (0.9) | (1.8) | (1.9) | (1.9) | (1.8) |
| Russia | 1997 | 6.1 | 2.0 | –1.6 | –5.8 | –6.7 | 1.3 | 1.6 | 1.8 | 1.7 | — |
| | | (1.4) | (0.5) | (–0.4) | (–1.4) | (–1.6) | (0.3) | (0.4) | (0.4) | (0.4) | — |
| Brazil | 1997 | 4.8 | 8.8 | 1.7 | — | — | 6.3 | 8.5 | 8.2 | — | — |
| | | (0.6) | (1.1) | (0.2) | — | — | (0.8) | (1.1) | (1.0) | — | — |
| Turkey | 1999 | 3.3 | 13.2 | 21.2 | 23.2 | — | 0.2 | 0.6 | 1.3 | — | — |
| | | (1.8) | (7.2) | (11.5) | (12.5) | — | (0.1) | (0.3) | (0.7) | — | — |
| Turkey[b] | 2000 | 9.9 | 17.9 | 19.9 | — | — | 0.4 | 1.1 | — | — | — |
| | | (5.0) | (9.0) | (10.0) | — | — | (0.2) | (0.5) | — | — | — |
| Argentina | 2000 | 8.9 | 9.3 | 10.5 | — | — | 1.7 | 0.5 | — | — | — |
| | | (3.1) | (3.3) | (3.7) | — | — | (0.6) | (0.2) | — | — | — |
| Brazil | 2000 | 6.6 | 19.1 | 26.5 | — | — | 1.2 | 3.0 | — | — | — |
| | | (1.3) | (3.7) | (5.2) | — | — | (0.2) | (0.6) | — | — | — |
| Uruguay | 2001 | 1.6 | 2.3 | — | — | — | 0.7 | — | — | — | — |
| | | (8.9) | (12.2) | — | — | — | (3.7) | — | — | — | — |

— = not available

IMF = International Monetary Fund
MDBs = multilateral development banks

a. Mexico did not receive IMF financing until early 1995, so formally 1994 is the precrisis year. However, Mexico used a large fraction of its reserves in the course of 1994 defending the peso, so 1993 data present a more accurate picture of changes in Mexico's net reserve.
b. Turkey received a modest augmentation to its existing IMF program at the end of 2000, so formally the pre-crisis year is 1999. However, the fall 2000 program was massively augmented in 2001, so starting from 2000 presents a better picture of the path of IMF lenidng.

*Sources:* World Bank, *Global Development Finance* (2003); IMF financial data by country, www.imf.org.

| Change in bilateral exposure | | | | | Change in official exposure (sum of IMF, MDB, and bilateral exposure) | | | | | Change in net reserves | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Yr 1 | Yr 2 | Yr 3 | Yr 4 | Yr 5 | Yr 1 | Yr 2 | Yr 3 | Yr 4 | Yr 5 | Yr 1 | Yr 2 | Yr 3 | Yr 4 | Yr 5 |
| 10.1 | 1.3 | –3.8 | –4.3 | –5.2 | 3.6 | 11.4 | 0.8 | 0.2 | –4.9 | –1.4 | 3.7 | 17.3 | 21.0 | 24.9 |
| (2.5) | (0.3) | (–0.9) | (–1.1) | (–1.3) | (5.8) | (2.8) | (0.2) | (0.1) | (–1.2) | (–0.3) | (0.7) | (3.5) | (4.2) | (5.0) |
| — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | –17.9 | –19.3 | –14.2 | –0.6 | 3.1 |
| — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | (–4.4) | (–4.7) | (–3.5) | (–0.1) | (0.8) |
| 4.3 | 6.0 | 8.8 | 7.9 | 6.3 | 7.3 | 10.9 | 14.7 | 13.3 | 10.4 | –14.0 | –12.1 | –7.1 | –8.8 | –7.1 |
| (2.3) | (3.3) | (4.9) | (4.3) | (3.5) | (4.0) | (6.0) | (8.1) | (7.3) | (5.7) | (–7.7) | (–6.7) | (–3.9) | (–4.8) | (–3.9) |
| –2.2 | 2.3 | 7.5 | 6.3 | 4.7 | –0.7 | 12.0 | 20.2 | 19.8 | 15.9 | –4.6 | –4.6 | –2.1 | –0.6 | –0.1 |
| (–1.0) | (1.0) | (3.3) | (2.8) | (2.1) | (–0.3) | (5.3) | (8.9) | (8.7) | (7.0) | (–2.0) | (–2.0) | (–0.9) | (–0.3) | (–0.1) |
| –0.3 | –1.0 | 1.9 | 1.6 | 0.1 | 15.4 | 25.1 | 18.1 | 17.2 | 9.6 | –24.7 | 1.0 | 33.8 | 56.3 | 68.7 |
| (0.0) | (–0.2) | (0.4) | (0.3) | (0.0) | (3.0) | (4.8) | (3.5) | (3.3) | (1.8) | (–4.8) | (0.2) | (6.5) | (10.8) | (13.2) |
| 3.9 | 6.0 | 4.8 | –1.9 | — | 11.3 | 9.6 | 4.9 | –6.0 | — | –11.2 | –6.4 | 13.0 | 25.4 | 38.0 |
| (0.9) | (1.4) | (1.1) | (–0.4) | — | (2.6) | (2.2) | (1.1) | (–1.4) | — | (–2.6) | (–1.5) | (3.0) | (5.9) | (8.9) |
| –0.6 | –1.8 | –1.0 | — | — | 10.4 | 15.5 | 8.9 | — | — | –13.0 | –24.8 | –20.1 | — | — |
| (–0.1) | (–0.2) | (–0.1) | — | — | (1.3) | (1.9) | (1.1) | — | — | (–1.6) | (–3.1) | (–2.5) | — | — |
| 0.0 | –0.7 | –0.4 | — | — | 3.5 | 13.9 | 22.1 | — | — | –4.1 | –17.7 | –17.4 | –12.6 | — |
| (0.0) | (–0.4) | (–0.2) | — | — | (1.9) | (7.5) | (12.0) | — | — | (–2.2) | (–9.6) | (–9.4) | (–6.8) | — |
| –0.7 | –0.4 | — | — | — | 10.4 | 18.6 | — | — | — | –13.6 | –13.3 | –8.4 | — | — |
| (–0.4) | (–0.2) | — | — | — | (5.2) | (9.3) | — | — | — | (–6.8) | (–6.7) | (–4.2) | — | — |
| –1.0 | 0.4 | — | — | — | 9.6 | 10.1 | — | — | — | –19.5 | –23.9 | –21.5 | — | — |
| (–0.3) | (0.1) | — | — | — | (3.4) | (3.6) | — | — | — | (–6.9) | (–8.4) | (–7.6) | — | — |
| –1.7 | –1.0 | — | — | — | 6.0 | 21.1 | — | — | — | –4.1 | –13.9 | –9.9 | — | — |
| (–0.3) | (–0.2) | — | — | — | (1.2) | (4.1) | — | — | — | (–0.8) | (–2.7) | (–1.9) | — | — |
| 0.0 | — | — | — | — | 2.3 | — | — | — | — | –4.0 | –3.3 | — | — | — |
| (–0.2) | — | — | — | — | (12.3) | — | — | — | — | (–21.4) | (–17.7) | — | — | — |

## Table A.2 Exposure of private creditors, annual data (billions of dollars, percent of GDP in parentheses)

| | | Change in bond exposure (sum of the outstanding bonds of public and private sectors) | | | | | Change in bank exposure (sum of bank lending to public sector and short-term debts) | | | | | Change in private exposure (sum of bank and bond exposure) | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Country** | **Start** | **Yr 1** | **Yr 2** | **Yr 3** | **Yr 4** | **Yr 5** | **Yr 1** | **Yr 2** | **Yr 3** | **Yr 4** | **Yr 5** | **Yr 1** | **Yr 2** | **Yr 3** | **Yr 4** | **Yr 5** |
| Mexico | 1994 | 3.8 | 13.9 | 13.0 | 15.2 | 19.5 | –1.1 | –7.8 | –4.6 | 5.6 | 13.5 | 2.8 | 6.1 | 8.4 | 20.8 | 33.0 |
| | | (0.9) | (3.4) | (3.2) | (3.7) | (4.8) | (–0.3) | (–1.9) | (–1.1) | (1.4) | (3.3) | (0.7) | (1.5) | (2.1) | (5.1) | (8.1) |
| Thailand | 1996 | 1.6 | 1.1 | –0.2 | –1.5 | –3.2 | –12.0 | –19.8 | –30.4 | –45.0 | –52.6 | –10.4 | –18.7 | –30.6 | –46.5 | –55.8 |
| | | (0.9) | (0.6) | (–0.1) | (–0.8) | (–1.8) | (–6.6) | (–10.9) | (–16.7) | (–24.7) | (–28.9) | (–5.7) | (–10.3) | (–16.8) | (–25.6) | (–30.7) |
| Indonesia | 1996 | 3.1 | 3.0 | 1.6 | –0.5 | –1.9 | 5.3 | 8.0 | 2.2 | –1.3 | –3.6 | 8.3 | 11.0 | 3.8 | –1.8 | –5.5 |
| | | (1.3) | (1.3) | (0.7) | (–0.2) | (–0.8) | (2.3) | (3.5) | (1.0) | (–0.6) | (–1.6) | (3.7) | (4.8) | (1.7) | (–0.8) | (–2.4) |
| Korea | 1996 | 8.8 | 13.8 | 13.0 | 14.0 | 14.4 | –2.6 | –14.3 | –15.5 | –17.5 | –28.7 | 6.3 | –0.5 | –2.5 | –3.5 | –14.3 |
| | | (1.7) | (2.6) | (2.5) | (2.7) | (2.8) | (–0.5) | (–2.7) | (–3.0) | (–3.4) | (–5.5) | (1.2) | (–0.1) | (–0.5) | (–0.7) | (–2.7) |
| Russia[a] | 1997 | 11.6 | 11.3 | 31.3 | 30.5 | — | 8.9 | 9.9 | –18.9 | –13.4 | — | 20.5 | 21.2 | 12.4 | 17.2 | — |
| | | (2.7) | (2.6) | (7.3) | (7.1) | — | (2.1) | (2.3) | (–4.4) | (–3.1) | — | (4.8) | (4.9) | (2.9) | (4.0) | — |
| Brazil | 1997 | 1.7 | 2.6 | 1.8 | — | — | 31.5 | 28.5 | 31.3 | — | — | 33.2 | 31.1 | 33.1 | — | — |
| | | (0.2) | (0.3) | (0.2) | — | — | (3.9) | (3.5) | (3.9) | — | — | (4.1) | (3.9) | (4.1) | — | — |
| Brazil[b] | 1998 | 0.9 | 0.1 | –4.4 | — | — | –2.9 | –0.2 | –14.8 | — | — | –2.0 | –0.1 | –19.2 | — | — |
| | | (0.1) | (0.0) | (–0.6) | — | — | (–0.4) | (0.0) | (–1.9) | — | — | (–0.3) | (0.0) | (–2.4) | — | — |
| Turkey | 1999 | 4.9 | 4.1 | 6.1 | — | — | 7.9 | –4.0 | 2.4 | — | — | 12.8 | 0.1 | 8.5 | — | — |
| | | (2.6) | (2.2) | (3.3) | — | — | (4.3) | (–2.2) | (1.3) | — | — | (6.9) | (0.0) | (4.6) | — | — |
| Argentina[c,d] | 2000 | –17.3 | –14.1 | — | — | — | –11.5 | –16.6 | — | — | — | –28.8 | –30.7 | — | — | — |
| | | (–6.1) | (–5.0) | — | — | — | (–4.0) | (–5.9) | — | — | — | (–10.1) | (–10.8) | — | — | — |
| Brazil | 2000 | –4.5 | –1.9 | — | — | — | –14.7 | –30.2 | — | — | — | –19.2 | –32.0 | — | — | — |
| | | (–0.9) | (–0.4) | — | — | — | (–2.9) | (–5.9) | — | — | — | (–3.8) | (–6.3) | — | — | — |
| Turkey | 2000 | –0.8 | 1.2 | — | — | — | –11.9 | –5.5 | — | — | — | –12.7 | –4.3 | — | — | — |
| | | (–0.4) | (0.6) | — | — | — | (–6.0) | (–2.8) | — | — | — | (–6.4) | (–2.2) | — | — | — |
| Uruguay | 2001 | 0.2 | — | — | — | — | –1.4 | — | — | — | — | –1.3 | — | — | — | — |
| | | (0.9) | — | — | — | — | (–7.7) | — | — | — | — | (–6.8) | — | — | — | — |

— = not available

a. Russia's exchange of London Club Soviet-era syndicated bank loans for Russian eurobonds explains the large increase in bond exposure and the large fall in bank exposure.

b. Brazil experienced large inflows in the first half of 1998 and significant outflows in the second half of 1998. In this case, annual data has its limits, since starting neither at the end of 1997 nor at the end of 1998 presents a perfect picture of Brazil's crisis.

c. World Bank *Global Development Finance* data for outstanding bank loans to Argentina's private sector in 2001 and 2002 were inconsistent with their flow numbers. The flow numbers suggest a sharp fall in exposure; the 2001 stock number suggests an increase in exposure to $21.794 billion. This seems likely to be a misprint, as it is inconsistent with other data sources as well as the flow data. We adjusted the end of 2000 stock number with 2001 and 2002 flow numbers to produce our estimate.

d. World Bank *Global Development Finance* data often includes international bonds held by domestic residents. The large fall in Argentina's stock of outstanding bonds in 2001 reflects the impact of Argentina's bonds for guaranteed loans swap, as many domestic residents swapped their holdings of Argentina's international bonds for a new domestic-law, guaranteed loan. See appendix table A.3.

*Source:* World Bank, *Global Development Finance* (2003).

## Table A.3 Summary of past restructuring cases

| Country | Time | Payments suspension | Size of restructuring | Terms | Bank loans or traded securities | Collective action/ coordination | Official-sector involvement |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Korea** | December 1997–March 1998 | No (averted by successful rollover) | $24 billion | Commitment to roll over/maintain exposure to Korean banks until March 31, 1998 (agreement reached on January 16); agreement to restructure $24 billion in bank loans into one-, two-, and three-year sovereign debt at 225, 250, and 275 basis points over LIBOR, reached before the March deadline. Korea's government guaranteed payments to external creditors in early December in an early attempt to stem the rolloff of bank lines | Interbank loans; efforts to monitor OTC derivatives were dropped when derivatives did not prove to be a major problem | Bank coordinating committee; daily monitoring of exposure/rollover rates (rollover rate was not 100 percent in January—some small and mid-sized banks exited) | Moral suasion of banks from central banks and finance ministries; Federal Reserve Bank of New York hosted a December 24, 1997, meeting with the banks; similar meetings held in other capitals; monitoring by G-10, central banks, and the IMF |
| **Indonesia I** | May 1998–May 1999 | No (informal suspension on payments of corporate loans, not of interbank loans) | $6.4 billion, in two tranches ($2.8 billion and $3.6 billion) | Short-, medium- and long-term claims on Indonesian banks coming due between May 1998, and the end of 2000 were restructured into new instruments amortizing from 1999–2005, carrying interest rates of LIBOR plus 275 to 350 basis points (with higher interest rates on payments due at a later date), fully guaranteed by Bank Indonesia | Interbank loans; note that there was also a de facto standstill on payments by Indonesian firms to their external banks | Bank coordinating committee (Frankfurt) | IMF moral suasion; monitoring by G-10 and central banks in 1998 |

(table continues on next page)

**Table A.3 Summary of past restructuring cases** *(continued)*

| Country | Time | Payments suspension | Size of restructuring | Terms | Bank loans or traded securities | Collective action/ coordination | Official-sector involvement |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Ukraine I** | 1998–99 | Yes (suspension during negotiations) | $0.63 billion (October 1998); $0.11 billion (October 1998); $0.16 billion (June 1999) | 1998 (Merrill): $0.126 billion (20 percent) paid in cash; $0.504 billion rolled in 2000 zero coupon bond with yield of 20 percent.1998 (Chase): $0.027 billion paid in cash; $0.082 billion in one-year notes restructured into an amortizing instrument with final maturity in October 2000. 1999 (ING): $0.089 billion paid in cash; $0.074 billion restructured for two years at yield of 21 percent by augmenting Ukraine's deutsche mark bonds. | Traded securities (structured transactions) | Negotiations with issuers (Merrill, Chase, and ING), who placed structured transactions; limited negotiations with Merrill; intensive negotiations before 1998 deal with Chase and 1999 deal with ING | IMF reserve floor prevented it from financing repayment; IMF capped amount of debt that could be paid in cash |
| **Indonesia II** | 1998–2000 | No | $0.55 billion in two restructurings | 1998: $0.21 billion due in 1998–99 restructured with payments into instruments with amortization from 2002–09, at same interest rate as before (LIBOR plus 87.5 basis points) 2000: $0.34 billion due between 2000 and 2002 restructured, with amortization payments from 2003–2013 | Bank lines (repayment of drawings on contingent credit facilities) | Bank committee (predominantly Japanese banks) | Paris Club comparability requirement led Indonesia to seek a restructuring. |

| | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Russia I** | August 1998 | Yes | $33.4 billion in GKOs; $14.9 billion in OFZs; external creditors accounted for roughly $9.2 billion of the $48.8 billion total pre-devaluation amounts | Accounts paid into the frozen bank accounts, subsequently restructured into new, unconvertible instruments; maturing bonds exchanged for 10 percent cash and the remainder in three- to five-year bonds; conversion of ruble payments into dollars limited; in the interim, large devaluation wiped out external value of claims | Traded securities (domestic debt) | Unsatisfactory negotiations; Russia announced restructuring offer in mid-September 1998, one month after its default; Russian and external banks refused the offer, initiated protracted negotiations | No official involvement |
| **Russia II** | November 1998–July 2000 | Yes; in late 1998, Russia paid the Prins, Prins paid with new bonds; banks declared formal default in January 1999; Russia missed payments on Ians in June 1999 | $28.63 billion in outstanding principal on Prins and Ians and $2.80 billion in past due interest (PDI) | $28.63 billion in London Club debt exchanged into $18.19 billion of 30-year global bonds with step-up interest rates; $2.80 billion of PDI restructured into $2.53 billion 10-year global bonds and $0.27 billion in cash; there was a seven-year grace on principal on the 30-year bonds and a six-year grace on principal on the 10-year bonds; Russian Federation new obligor on debt | Traded securities: previously restructured Soviet-era bank debt (Prins and Ians) that had largely been repackaged and sold to bond investors | Bank Advisory Committee (same committee that handled previous restructuring, despite substantial change in composition of creditors); Prins and Ians, like most syndicated bank loans, lacked collective action clauses | No direct official involvement, though it was clear that this restructuring would meet Paris Club comparability requirement (Paris Club was not prepared to provide debt reduction, only debt rescheduling) |
| **Pakistan** | February–December 1999 | No | $0.61 billion (three bonds) | Bonds restructured at par into a $0.62 billion 2005 bond, with four equal amortization payments from 2002 to 2005; the new bond paid an interest rate of 10 percent | Eurobonds (English law) | Ad hoc consultation; majority-amendment provisions not used | Paris Club comparability requirement forced Pakistan to seek a restructuring |

*(table continues on next page)*

## Table A.3 Summary of past restructuring cases (continued)

| Country | Time | Payments suspension | Size of restructuring | Terms | Bank loans or traded securities | Collective action/ coordination | Official-sector involvement |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Brazil** | March 1999 | No | Roughly $50 billion in monitored exposure from G-10 banks | | Bank lines: Voluntary agreement by major banks to maintain end-February 1999 exposure for next six months | | Monitoring by central banks in lender countries |
| **Ecuador** | August 1999–August 2000 | Yes | $6.46 billion (six bonds) + $0.265 billion in arrears, including $3.35 billion of collateralized Brady bonds, $2.61 billion of uncollateralized Brady bonds, and $0.55 billion in eurobonds | $6.46 billion in bonds (with average interest rate of around 5.2 percent) exchanged for $3.85 billion in new bonds ($1.25 billion in 12 percent 2012 bonds and $2.6 billion in a 10 percent step-up bond maturing in 2030), $0.882 billion in collateral, and $0.143 billion in cash | Bonds (New York–law Brady bonds and eurobonds) | Comprehensive exchange offer; ad hoc consultative group initially formed but not regularly consulted; ad hoc market soundings by Ecuador adviser; amendment of financial terms precluded; use of exit consents to amend nonfinancial terms in exchange so as to encourage participation | Restructuring completed in the context of IMF program that presumed Paris Club restructuring; IMF lending into arrears |
| **Ukraine II** | January–April 2000 | Yes | $1.86 billion (five bond issues maturing in 2000 and 2001); $0.74 billion in Gazprom bonds in a separate exchange | Cash settlement of accrued interest ($0.225 billion) and an exchange of old debt at par (or close to par for one bond) for 2007 bonds, with 11 percent dollar coupon, 10 percent euro coupon, and step-up amortization payments starting in 2001 | Bonds (English and German laws) | Comprehensive exchange offer; intensive, coordinated effort to sell the deal and contact retail holders; amendment provisions used to cram down terms on holdouts in three bonds that had clauses | Restructuring completed before IMF program, but with IMF support (comfort letter); clear that IMF program would not provide financing needed to avoid restructuring plus IMF review of financial terms |

| | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Turkey** | December 2000 | No | $18.6 billion | Voluntary agreement to roll over existing exposure with monitoring by IMF | Bank loans only | Ad hoc consultation led by Deutsche Bank and Citibank | Rollover undertaken in conjunction with IMF program; IMF and Turkish authorities participated in ad hoc consultations organized by Deutsche Bank and Citibank; no G-10 central bank participation |
| **Argentina I** | November 2001 | No | $41 billion in sovereign debt; $9 billion in provincial debt | Maturity extension and coupon reduction in exchange for pledge of tax revenue; international bonds held by domestic investors were exchanged for new guaranteed loans governed by domestic Argentine law; the loans were backed, in theory, by revenue from the financial transaction taxes; interest rates on the new loans were reduced to either 7 or 70 percent of their original level, and maturities were pushed out three years on all bonds maturing before 2010; holders of the guaranteed loans had the option of reclaiming their original bond if Argentina offered better terms in the planned phase 2 external exchange | Bonds (New York law) | Heavy moral suasion of local banks and pension funds, implicit threat of default | The exchange was undertaken as part of a broad commitment to seek a debt restructuring as part of the augmented IMF program; $3 billion from the IMF was in principle available to support an international exchange but was never used; the guaranteed loans issued in this exchange were later pesified |

(table continues on next page)

## Table A.3 Summary of past restructuring cases *(continued)*

| Country | Time | Payments suspension | Size of restructuring | Terms | Bank loans or traded securities | Collective action/ coordination | Official-sector involvement |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Argentina II** | January–February 2002 | Yes | $41 billion in sovereign debt; $9 billion in provincial debt | Forced exchange of guaranteed loans for new peso-denominated debt; creditors who accepted pesification exchanged $1 face for 1.4 pesos face; the new peso bonds paid a 2 percent coupon and an annual inflation adjustment, which was capitalized; approximately $20 billion did not accept pesification; the government is seeking to force these holders to reclaim their original bonds | Argentina-law bank loans | Default on old instruments; heavy moral suasion/regulatory forbearance for domestic banks (bank liabilities were also pesified) | No official involvement at the time of the exchange |
| **Uruguay** | April 2003 | No | $5.45 billion; $3.85 billion of this was in 19 international bonds, $1.6 billion was in 46 domestic bonds; domestic investors also held some international bonds | $5.06 billion (93 percent) of bondholders elected to participate, resulting in $5.02 billion in new bonds; bondholders could elect to swap either into a bond with maturities extended by five years or into a benchmark bond; the holdouts were concentrated in the international bonds | Bonds (mostly New York law, only the $250 million Samurai bonds contained collective action clauses) | Ad hoc consultation and informal dialogue; regulatory treatment of domestic bonds strongly encouraged participation in the exchange; exit consents used in New York–law bonds; collective action clauses used with Japanese-law bonds; new bonds contain innovative "aggregation" provisions as well as 75 percent voting for amending key terms | Bond exchange was necessary to provide the financing assurances for continued IMF lending; the exchange was linked to an IMF program that provided $3 billion to halt the bank run |

| | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Argentina III** | September 2003 to present | Yes | Roughly $60 billion outstanding: $50 billion principal plus $10 billion interest arrears held by international investors and roughly $20 billion in bonds held by domestic pension funds who did not accept the pesification of the guaranteed loans | | Bonds (New York, English, Japanese, German, and Argentine laws) | Some bonds organized in committees, with at least three groupings: an association organized by Italian banks that represents Italian retail investors, a special purpose vehicle backed by German banks that represents $1 billion in retail investors, and a committee of institutional investors |

Note: See text for explanation of acronyms.

*Source:* Authors' compilation.